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The evolution of social protection 
policy in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’: 
Contributory social insurance reform 
and limited social assistance for the 







During the 2000s, Ghana introduced substantial social protection policy reforms. 
The contributory pensions system was reformed from a single statutory defined-
benefit scheme and a colonial-era unfunded scheme for civil servants to a new 
system with additional mandatory and voluntary privately-administered ‘tiers’ 
augmenting the statutory scheme. A new contributory national health insurance 
scheme was introduced in 2003. Several forms of social assistance targeted at the 
(largely rural) poor, including a school feeding programme, ‘capitation grants’ 
to expand free primary education and the flagship Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer scheme were introduced. All of these 
reforms were initiated under John Kufuor (of the New Patriotic Party, NPP), who 
had defeated Jerry Rawlings (and his National Democratic Convention, NDC) in 
2000. When the NDC returned to power in 2008, it continued the implementation 
of NPP-initiated reforms, modestly expanded cash transfers and maintained 





This paper examines Ghana’s welfare policy reforms in the period 2000-2014. 
During this period substantial reforms of contributory social insurance were 
undertaken, in particular, the contributory pensions system was augmented with 
two private sector ‘tiers’ and a national health insurance scheme introduced. 
Social assistance aimed at the rural poor was expanded, with the Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) launched in 2007 as the flagship 
programme of a new National Social Protection Strategy. While LEAP is often 
held up as a powerful example of a home-grown cash transfer scheme in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the ‘capitation grant’ (school fee exemption at primary level) and 
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Ghana School feeding Programme (introduced in 2004 and 2005 respectively), 
are arguably more significant pro-poor social programmes. 
 
These reforms occurred in the period of multi-party government that followed 
decades of political and economic turmoil in Ghana. In 1964, the left-wing 
independence leader Kwame Nkrumah’s government declared a one-party state. 
This was overthrown in a military coup in 1966. A series of further coups and 
brief returns to democracy – there were four successful military coups and one 
‘palace coup’ between 1967 and 1981 (Boafo-Arthur, 1999: 47) – ended with a 
period of stable People’s National Defence Council (PNDC) rule under the 
leadership of Jerry Rawlings from 1981. Ghana emerged from military 
dictatorship in 1992 (the birth of the so-called ‘Fourth Republic’) with a 
presidential election won by the incumbent, although a substantial share of the 
vote had gone to the presidential candidate of the main opposition party (the New 
Patriotic Party, NPP), which then boycotted parliamentary elections, alleging 
fraud. Subsequent elections have generally been deemed ‘free and fair’ with a 
relative stable ‘two-party’ system emerging. Rawlings had transformed the 
military PNDC regime into a political party, the National Democratic Congress, 
which defined itself as ‘socialist’ and adopted populist rhetoric despite having 
overseen IMF/World Bank-sponsored ‘structural adjustment’ macroeconomic 
reforms from 1983.  
 
In 2000, the ‘market-oriented’ opposition candidate John Kufuor won the 
presidential election and his party, the NPP, won exactly half of the seats in 
parliament. The NPP was nominally ‘right of centre’, avowedly pro-market and 
traced its roots back to the opposition to Kwame Nkrumah in the 1950s and 1960s 
and to the brief Busia (Progress Party) civilian government of 1969-1972.1 In 
2008, after a second Kufuor presidential term, the NDC regained power, with John 
Atta Mills winning the presidential election and the NDC a majority of 
parliamentary seats. Ghana is therefore one of very few Sub-Saharan African 
democracies that has passed the ‘two peaceful transitions of power’ test. Elections 
remain highly competitive and political debate fierce. Some pre- and post-election 
violence has occurred, and allegations of rigging levelled during several elections, 
but Ghana is generally considered to have made remarkable progress towards 
democratic consolidation (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). 
 
Welfare reforms have continued across changes of government. Some reforms of 
the contributory pensions system (in many respects still a direct heritage of 
colonial administrations and early initiatives of Nkrumah postcolonial 
government) were undertaken in 1992. The post-1992 Rawlings government, 
despite its populist rhetoric and purported ‘socialist’ ideology, continued along a 
                                         
1 John Kufuor served in Busia’s government as a junior minister. 
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similar policy path as the pre-1992 PNDC government. The NPP, between 2000 
and 2008, introduced significant reforms of the contributory pensions system, the 
introduction of the mandatory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) for 
premium-paying workers (and eventually premium exemption for children, 
pregnant women and ‘indigents’), school fee abolition and the school feeding 
programme, as well the first substantial direct cash transfer scheme (LEAP). The 
implementation of the pension reforms and much of the expansion of LEAP and 
other social assistance programmes took place after the NDC’s return to power. 
 
Three features of the history of welfare reforms in Ghana are immediately 
striking. First, the most significant reforms – significant expansion of the coverage 
of social insurance and the introduction of social assistance in the form of cash 
transfers and social programmes aimed at improving primary school-aged 
children – were introduced under a right-of-centre party. This represents 
somewhat of a puzzle: why would a free market-oriented party significantly 
expand social protection and in particular introduce cash transfers which had in 
many other African countries been opposed by ruling elites that derided them as 
‘handouts’? The answer may well lie in both the electoral dynamics of Ghana’s 
unusually competitive democracy as well as the steadily growing power of the 
‘technocratic’ and ‘ideological’ agendas in favour of social protection (see 
Devereux and White, 2010). Second, there is a strong focus on social insurance 
in Ghanaian welfare policy. These included the addition of two additional tiers of 
defined-contribution and privately-administered pension schemes to the existing 
defined-benefit and partially-funded systems in the reforms eventually enacted in 
2008. In addition, universal access to healthcare was pursued through the 
introduction of a national health insurance scheme, funded through both 
premiums and state-subsidised membership for designated categories, but 
intended to be largely financially self-sustainable. This might not be surprising 
given the prominent role of a pro-market, right-wing party in the reforms, but it is 
unusual for an African country, where social protection is usually thought of 
primarily as social assistance to the rural poor (through agricultural input 
subsidies, food aid and, increasingly, cash transfers) (Seekings, 2014). The third 
distinctive feature is that there appears to exist broad cross-party consensus on the 
need for a comprehensive social protection system (as well as on the broad 
character of this system), and a relatively high degree of bureaucratic autonomy 
and competency with respect to social protection policy-making and 
implementation. This ‘national consensus’ – despite periodic accusations from 
both parties that the other abuse social policy for naked electoral benefit2 – seems 
                                         
2 For example, in December 2014 the ruling NDC’s Deputy Minister of Education argued in 
Parliament that the NPP’s pledge of free secondary education during the 2012 election 
campaign was an attempt at “vote buying” (Today Ghana News, 2014). Similar accusations 
have been common, especially during election campaigns. It has also been argued in the 
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genuine, and it is undeniably the case that both major parties support the main 
elements of the current policy framework. This is illustrated, for example, by the 
enthusiastic embrace (without even rebranding) of LEAP by the NDC 
administration after the 2008 elections. 
 
This paper is primarily descriptive in that it sets out the reforms without close 
attention to explaining why they occurred. A separate, more analytical paper 
focuses on the politics of social protection policy reform (Grebe, 2015). The two 
papers are intended to be read together, with the second attempting to offer 
plausible explanations for the direction of social protection policy reform in 
Ghana since democratisation.  
 
This paper starts with a brief description of colonial and postcolonial welfare 
policy, and then contextualises reforms in terms of the structure of the Ghanaian 
economy and persistent regional inequalities (especially between the Northern 
and Southern regions). The paper briefly reviews the limited welfare reforms of 
the first elected NDC government (1992-2000), during which the contributory 
pensions system was reformed with the introduction of mandatory retirement 
savings for formal sector workers. The paper then turns to the more substantial 
reforms of both the contributory social insurance system – especially the pension 
system reforms and the introduction of national health insurance – and of social 
assistance, which included parametric reforms of fuel and agricultural subsidies, 
the school feeding scheme, expansion of free primary education and social 
assistance components of the health insurance system through premium 
exemptions. It then reviews the more recent history characterised largely by 
continuation and expansion of existing programmes under the second NDC 
government after 2004, and attempts to ‘rationalise’ and ‘institutionalise’ the 
social protection system with significant input from donors and international 
agencies – whose involvement in social protection programmes generally 
expanded during this period (both in terms of financing and technical assistance). 
The paper provides some detail on the roles of donors, technocrats and domestic 
political leaders in these reform processes – especially in programme design, 
financing, and implementation – although detailed analysis of the politics 
underlying the reform process is left for the companion paper. In conclusion, it 
offers brief reflections on the sustainability of current social protection policy and 
the prospects for continued expansion – especially in the light of a fiscal crisis and 
                                         
academic literature that patronage is rife at the local level in Ghana’s democracy, for example 
Lindberg (2003: 136) argues, 
‘It is quite possible that we are witnessing an unfolding situation where the elites have 
forged a consensus on formal democratic procedures on how to select who will govern. 
Yet, the very same elites succumb to or promote a way of managing politics (including 




the apparently limited appetite for large-scale cash transfers – and raises questions 
requiring further explanation. 
 
 
2. Background: Social security up to 2000 
 
2.1 Colonial and early postcolonial ‘development’ 
and social security policy 
 
Like other British colonies, colonial Ghana saw very limited development of 
formal social security systems, with colonial policy focusing on agricultural 
development, leaving social support to kin and community (see Seekings, 2013). 
Non-kin forms of support were chiefly provided by churches and missionaries, 
supplanted by secular welfare organisations after independence, including by 
international NGOs that became an important conduit of foreign aid from the 
1960s onwards (Luiz, 2013: 115). A substantial proportion of Ghana’s population 
relies on subsistence agriculture. Northern Ghana’s development has lagged 
behind the South, including as a result of being treated as a ‘labour reserve’ under 
the colonial administration and its developmental interests being subordinated to 
those of the South (Yaro and Hesselberg, 2010). Nearly ninety percent of the 
population in Northern Ghana rely on agriculture as their chief livelihood activity 
(88% of the total population). As a result, the North is substantially poorer than 
the South, with a poverty rate of 63% as compared to 20% in the South (WFP, 
2012: 2). Northern Ghana suffers greater food insecurity than the rest of the 
country, in part as a result of natural endowments such as lower rainfall and 
savannah vegetation (Rademacher-Schulz and Salifu Mahama, 2012: 18-19). 
Food security has long constituted a serious problem in Ghana, particularly in the 
North. Ghana received substantial food aid up to the early 1990s (USAID, 1997), 
although data from the World Food Programme show that Ghana has not received 
any food aid since 1997. 
 
Poverty persisted in the North despite the fact that Ghana overall was a 
paradigmatic example of a ‘peasant-export type’ of colonial political economy, 
rather than a ‘settler-type’ (Bowden and Mosley, 2012). In the ‘peasant-export’ 
colonies the colonial state exhibited more progressive expenditure patterns, and 
the ‘production functions were less biased against the poor’ (Bowden and Mosley, 
2012: 1): 
 
‘In the peasant export economies, much more than in the settler 
economies, the government shifted over the course of the 1920s from 
an expenditure pattern oriented towards security and ‘coercive 
expenditures towards an expenditure pattern oriented towards pro-poor 
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developmental activities for the benefit of the African majority – in 
particular, education, health and smallholder agriculture’ (Bowden and 
Mosley, 2012: 11). 
 
The suggestion is therefore that ‘peasant export’ economies like Ghana developed 
more pro-poor institutions than did settler economies under colonialism, and that 
these institutions affected the evolution of policy and welfare state-building after 
independence. Ghana did indeed appear to expand coverage of social insurance 
much more than most Sub-Saharan African countries, and was one of the only 
African countries to introduce – at least notionally – unemployment benefits 
(Luiz, 2013: 114). A comparison of the number of persons insured in 1970 shows 
a coverage rate of approximately 6% in Ghana, much higher than most African 
countries and especially than ‘settler’ economies like Zambia (Mouton, 1975, 
cited in Luiz, 2013: 114). It is conceivable that the rapid expansion of contributory 
social insurance coverage in the 2000s (see below) reflects, at least in part, 
structural factors such as the existence of large indigenous entrepreneurial trader 
and commercial small farmer classes, including cocoa producers, as well as 
institutional ‘path dependence’ that can be traced to colonial history. 
 
 
2.2 Structural adjustment and social insurance 
reform under Rawlings, pre- and post-
democratisation (1981-2000) 
 
By the time of Rawlings’ coup in 1981, Ghana had experienced near-continuous 
military rule for a decade and a half. Various statist economic experiments had 
failed to produce sustained growth or prosperity. For most of its postcolonial 
history Ghana had attempted a largely-failed state-led import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy and expansion of public services based on revenue 
generated through the taxation of export commodities (mainly gold, cocoa and 
timber). In 1981, Ghana’s economic situation was dire, with import volumes, 
export earnings and real GDP per capita having plummeted, high inflation, an 
overvalued currency and the country on the brink of a sovereign debt default. 
Economic conditions further worsened dramatically in 1982, leading the 
Rawlings regime to turn to international institutions for assistance (Kraus, 1991: 
21). While the PNDC espoused a socialist ideology and launched what Rawlings 
called a ‘people’s revolution’, its radical course alteration in early 1983 with the 
initiation of IMF-sponsored structural adjustment policies (Boafo-Arthur, 1999: 
46) was perhaps not surprising. Rawlings’ government invited the Bretton Woods 
institutions to devise a recovery plan and an IMF-designed Structural Adjustment 
Programme was implemented from April 1983, which included spending cuts (by 
reducing expenditure on social services and retrenching public servants), currency 
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devaluation, abolishing price controls, privatisation of state enterprises, etc. 
(Konadu-Agyemang, 2000: 474). Despite strong criticism of the social impacts of 
structural adjustment on the poor, of rising inequality and of spatial disparities, 
signs of economic recovery were quickly visible. Agriculture, manufacturing and 
trading grew by large margins in most of the 1984-89 period (Kraus, 1991: 28-
30) and macroeconomic indicators improved. Real annual GDP growth averaged 
1.4% during the 1970s, and after a sharp contraction during 1981-1983, recovered 
strongly to 5.7% during the rest of the 1980s (World Bank, 2014b). Consistently 
strong performance was also seen during the 1990s and 2000s.3 This probably 
made a significant contribution to creating sufficient fiscal space to eventually 
expand social expenditure. However, fiscal contraction during structural 
adjustment did inflict painful impacts, such as the dismissal of large numbers of 
public sector workers, and the introduction of user fees in both education and 
health, resulting in, for example, primary school enrolment growing more slowly 
than the population (Kraus, 1991: 31-32). As Kraus further points out, despite the 
economic recovery these policies were by no means uncontroversial: 
 
‘Following structural adjustment policies during 1984-90, Ghana's 
economy and society have recovered, in important senses, from years 
of deep recession, hyperinflation, and disinvestment… Although this 
growth was built on the base of a severely depressed economy, it is the 
longest - and only - period of sustained economic growth since 
independence in 1957. Nonetheless, a great many Ghanaians oppose the 
government's stabilization and structural adjustment programs (SAP), 
including intellectuals, students, workers and trade unionists, civil 
servants, many businessmen, taxi drivers, and the rising ranks of 
dismissed and unemployed workers and many politicians now seeking 
democracy and the removal of the [Rawlings PNDC] government’ 
(1991: 19). 
 
The economic recovery, coupled with painful impacts on living standards for 
many Ghanaians, probably helped consolidate Rawlings’ power before 
democratisation and may very well have contributed to his electoral victory 
in1992. But it appears also to have helped unleash the social forces that compelled 
democratisation. After democratisation, the Rawlings government was able to 
sustain the reform agenda – now with a democratic mandate – despite the negative 
social impacts of austerity. Boafo-Arthur attributes this to the dynamics of 
Ghanaian politics: 
 
                                         
3 Real annual GDP growth continued strongly at an average of 4.3% during the 1990s and 5.4% 
during the 1990s. Quality of life improved more slowly, with GDP per capita in constant US 
dollars having declined from $482 in 1960 to $321 in 1983, but recovered to $377 in 1990, 
$446 in 2000 and increased to $610 by 2010 $766 in 2013 (World Bank, 2014b). 
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‘To date, the ruling government has been able to manage a fair balance 
between democracy and structural adjustment because of the inherent 
dynamics of Ghanaian politics in the Fourth Republic and the continued 
support of the international community. These domestic dynamics 
include: the opposition's generally supportive economic agenda; the 
lack of a viable alternative to adjustment; the commitment of the ruling 
party to the process and political brinkmanship; and weak social forces’ 
(1999: 54). 
 
Indeed, neither the opposition NPP Presidential and Parliamentary election 
victories in 2000, nor the NDC’s return to power in 2008, occasioned radical 
economic policy shifts. The ‘fourth republic’ has therefore seen consistent broad 
cross-party support for fiscally conservative and market-oriented policy, 
including reforms aimed at increasing investment (foreign and domestic), 
macroeconomic stability, etc. 
 
The social insurance system in post-independence Ghana remained largely 
unchanged until the early 1990s. Civil servants were mostly covered under a 
scheme known as ‘Cap 30’ inherited from the colonial administration, and in the 
early post-independence period provident funds were introduced. According to 
Kpessa (2011a: 96), the provident funds (providing lump sum payments upon 
retirement or disability) were popular until the 1980s, when high inflation 
(exceeding interest rates) eroded the value of the lump-sum payments and 
currency devaluations and labour retrenchment policies further strained the 
provident funds. Partly in response to pressure from trade unions – who had been 
demanding Pay-As-You-Go social security with monthly retirement benefit 
payments, discussed as early as 1982 but not implemented owing to the rigorous 
conditions of the structural adjustment programme (Kpessa, 2011a: 96), 
significant reforms were introduced in 1991/92. The provident funds were 
converted and consolidated into a Pay-As-You-Go statutory social insurance 
scheme known as the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). This 
resulted in two parallel mandatory, defined-benefit schemes and equivalent 
contribution rates covering formal sector employees, but with differing eligibility 
criteria. Cap 30 (for civil servants) had a lower voluntary retirement age, a more 
beneficial benefits computation formula than SSNIT, and its benefits were paid 
from general government revenues (Kpessa, 2011f: 129). While both Cap 30 and 
the new SSNIT were defined-benefit schemes, and restricted to the relatively 
small formal sector, the reforms did expand mandatory retirement savings for 
non-public-sector workers and provided for relatively secure post-retirement 
income. SSNIT, while a statutory fund, was intended to be fully funded by 
contributions and ensure solvency and secure benefits without any drain on public 
resources. In the context of a very poorly-developed private retirement savings 




The fact that Cap 30 was unfunded placed significant strain on public finances 
and owing to its better benefits, it was subject to significant demand for eligibility. 
This fragmented and costly nature of the parallel system created, according to 
Kpessa, the impetus for the pension reform that would later be pursued by 
Kufuor’s NPP government. 
 
Economic reforms undertaken by Rawlings’ military and elected NDC 
governments in many ways created both the economic conditions (including fiscal 
space) and some of the impetus for the substantial social security reforms pursued 
by the Kufuor/NPP administration that came to power in the elections of 2000. In 
the next section, the focus shifts to reforms introduced after 2000, and the political 
dynamics that underpinned the reform process. 
 
 
3. Contributory social insurance reform (2000-
2008) 
 
Social protection policy during the Kufuor administration’s terms of office (2000-
2004 and 2004-2008) was dominated by two major reforms of contributory social 
insurance: the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003, and 
the augmentation of the statutory Social Security National Insurance Trust 
mandatory defined-benefit retirement scheme with two semi-private (i.e. 
privately-administered) ‘tiers’ of mandatory and voluntary defined-contribution 
retirement savings schemes towards the end of this period. What is most striking 
about this reform agenda (and, at first glance puzzling) is that it was the ‘centre-
right’ NPP that pursued the most significant social protection policy reforms, and 
that the primary focus (as evident both from the nature of the reforms enacted and 
interviews with senior figures such as former president Kufuor himself) of the 
reform agenda was contributory social security. This calls into question the 
conventional ideological categorisation of the NDC as ‘socialist’ and ‘populist’ 
and the NPP as ‘market-oriented’ or centre-right and also requires careful analysis 
of Ghanaian political dynamics during this period. The NPP government’s 
introduction of various social assistance schemes (including in the form of a small 
but significant cash transfer programme), perhaps more surprising from an 
ideological orientation point of view are discussed in the next section.  
 
The Kufuor/NPP government’s term of office coincided with a strong 
transnational ‘poverty reduction agenda’ in the engagement of international 
agencies (most prominently the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) 
with Sub-Saharan African countries. In the late 1990s, the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country initiative was launched, in terms of which countries like Ghana could 
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access debt relief on certain conditions, which included the production of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (see, for example, McGee, Levene, and Hughes, 2002; 
Craig and Porter, 2003; Fraser, 2005; Whitfield, 2005; Hickey and Mohan, 2008; 
Lazarus, 2008). Ghana produced two three-year development plans serving as its 
PRSPs during this period, known as the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(GPRS I and II) for 2003-2005 and 2006-2009 respectively (GoG, 2003a, 2003c, 
2005). In 2000, the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) were formulated 
following the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration by the 
General Assembly (UN, 2000). The MDGs included eradicating extreme poverty 
and hunger, achieving universal primary education, reducing child mortality, and 
other goals to be achieved by 2015, with specific targets and a monitoring system 
through which countries would report to the UN General Assembly.  
 
Furthermore, donors such as DFID were increasingly frustrated with the failure 
of development interventions and were starting to promote social protection in 
general, and cash transfers in particular, in Africa and launching a range of pilot 
programmes across the continent (see, a.o., Garcia and Moore, 2012; Grebe, 2014; 
Hickey, 2007; Hickey, Sabates-Wheeler, Günter, and MacAuslan, 2009). Even 
the World Bank published a ‘Social Protection Strategy’ for Africa in 2012, 
reflecting the emerging emphasis on social protection in development thinking 
and among international agencies over the preceding decade (World Bank, 
2012b). The policy reform process in Ghana should therefore be viewed in the 
context of a strong transnational agenda – partially backed by the force of 
conditionalities imposed under the HIPC programme – and strongly promoted by 
certain donors. This may help explain the social assistance and poverty-reduction 
initiatives (including child-focused initiatives) described in the next section, as 
well as social assistance components built into the health insurance system (see 
below), but stands somewhat in tension with the strong focus on contributory 
social security. It should further be noted that the Kufuor administration largely 
continued with market-oriented economic policy reforms initiated under 
Structural Adjustment and that the basics of macroeconomic policy (including 
fiscal discipline and monetary policy aimed at currency and price stability) were 
not highly contentious during this period. 
 
By the early 2000s, concern was growing about a growing threat of poverty among 
the elderly across the Global South (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000; Barrientos and Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2002; Barrientos, Gorman, and Heslop, 2003) and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular (Apt, 2002), in part owing to a growing population of elderly 
people and its perceived neglect in development policy. In the African context 
there existed wide concern over the decline in in customary kin support for older 
persons. Urbanisation was thought to contribute to this trend in that it occasioned 
the rise in nuclear families: “Traditional domestic arrangements have 
intergenerational support built into them and modern arrangements are in the 
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process of destroying this key social welfare feature,” argued Apt (2002: 44). In 
Ghana specifically, there was talk of a “crisis” owing to this decline as early as 
the early 1990s (Apt, 1992), with a range of studies appearing to show that support 
was declining, leaving elderly persons vulnerable (Aboderin, 2004a; 2004b; Apt, 
1986; 1991; 1992). Aboderin argued that: 
 
‘African debates increasingly stress the urgent need for comprehensive 
old age economic security policies in African countries… Ghana is one 
of these countries. It typifies the socioeconomic and demographic 
context in which the concern over a crisis in family support and the 
questions of policy formulation have arisen in recent decades’ (2004a: 
S128). 
 
The literature from this period generally laments a lack of policy attention to 
provision for the elderly – including their integration into the social and economic 
life of the broader community – among policy-makers. However, given that 
reform of the pensions system was firmly on the political agenda during the 2000s 
(as will be argued below, forming an important part of the Kufuor administration’s 
political programme during its two terms in office), it seems that this concern 
might in fact have percolated into the broader political discourse.  
 
Both the character of the reforms described below (confined to formal 
contributory schemes) and Kpessa’s (2011a) analysis of the politics of retirement 
income security reform suggests that reform was not driven primarily by concern 
over the well-being of the aged poor. Instead, postcolonial governments in Ghana 
appear to have viewed pensions both as “a mechanism for providing old age 
income support for individuals who have previously participated in the formal 
labour market” (my emphasis) and to achieve other goals, including economic 
development (by mobilising resources for investment) and “directed towards 
nation-building, galvanising support for political elites and for socio-economic 
development” (Kpessa, 2011a: 93). 
 
It appears that social security and wage reform formed an important part of 
President Kufuor’s policy agenda from the start of his term. According to a former 
special advisor and later Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei,4 - 
who was initially special advisor to the president and was tasked with driving the 
reform process –reforming the formal contributory pensions system to expand 
coverage and improve efficiencies was high on the new administration’s list of 
priorities,5 (although it took until Kufuor’s second term before significant reforms 
                                         
4 Dr Akoto-Osei was first a special advisor to the President, and later became a Minister of State 
for Finance (and eventually briefly acting Finance Minister towards the end of Kufuor’s second 
term of office). After 2008, he became an opposition MP for the NPP. 
5 Interview, Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 November 2014. 
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could be implemented). Interviews with him and Former President Kufuor reflect 
a further rhetorical commitment to expanding social assistance to the poorest, 
although the primary focus in practice was clearly on contributory social 
insurance. 
 
There was a general philosophical undertaking by the president, when he came 
into office. Given the general ideological orientation of our party in terms of 
laissez-faire and so forth, to assure Ghanaians that in spite of the path that he was 
going to take, that there will be protection for the vulnerable in our society. We 
want to move along the capitalist path, but we want to make sure that the poor and 
vulnerable are protected. … In the first week after assuming power, he summoned 
the economic management team, and his direction was, I want to increase public 
sector workers’ remuneration by 100%, tell me how much it will cost. Clearly he 
had been thinking about the welfare of workers and that the current system of 
SSNIT had not been working well (Interview, Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 
November 2014). 
 
Former President Kufuor himself explains that his political philosophy was one 
of encouraging private enterprise coupled with an appropriate social safety net: 
 
‘I believed they could do far better with good leadership, leadership of 
concern for the wellbeing of the people … focused on the social 
development of the people. … We believed in sound economic 
management, and we are constitutionalists that accord individuals their 
rights, governed under the rule of law. … Allowing private initiative, 
because Government cannot do it alone. … And of course fixing the 
safety net, so that the vulnerable, the handicapped, the state would take 
care of. But anyone who could do things for themselves, allow them to 
do it’ (Interview, John A. Kufuor, 6 November 2014). 
 
Dr Akoto-Osei explains that as soon as the administration was free from the 
constraints imposed under the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative) – 
under which countries could qualify for debt relief conditional on the production 
of so-called Policy Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and the full benefits of 
which could only be realised if commitments to fiscal restraint were made – the 
administration embarked on a three-pronged social policy reform programme. 
This included (1) public sector salary reform (not discussed extensively in this 
paper, but which eventually resulted in the so-called single-spine salary structure 
for civil servants and added substantially to the state’s wage bill), (2) reform of 
the contributory pensions system (“we knew the SSNIT was not optimal” says 
Akoto-Osei) as well as the introduction of a contributory National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and (3) the introduction of social assistance in the form 
of school feeding and school fee exemption programmes and the domestically-
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funded LEAP cash transfer scheme (discussed in the next section) . The intention 
was to reach as large as possible a proportion of poor and vulnerable households, 
including with the contributory social insurance (pensions and health) schemes, 
through coverage of informal sector workers and subsistence farmers, and 
exemptions from NHIS premiums.6 
 
The political purposes served by social protection policy reform will be addressed 
in the companion paper. Suffice it to note that electoral incentives, elite dynamics 
and ideological and technocratic agendas played a significant part in the policy 
choices made and the dynamics of policy-making. Here the main reforms 
introduced under the first and second Kufuor administrations will be described, 
with some reflection on the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in the policy-
making process. Civil society voices, including development social inclusion-
oriented NGOs and organised labour, are noticeably under-represented in this 
account – reflecting in part a paucity of primary data on civil society’s input into 
the policy-making process. 
 
 
3.1 The Kufuor administration’s wage and pension 
reforms 
 
By 2006, the SSNIT had seen substantial growth in membership, from about 
648,000 active members at its inception, to more than 1.2 million active members 
(Kpessa, 2011a: 97).7 Despite, this, the scheme was seen as sub-optimal and a 
perceived need existed for a more comprehensive social security package. While 
SSNIT did allow for voluntary contributions, take-up was very poor among 
informal sector workers and self-employed farmers. 
 
The pension reform had (according to Akoto-Osei) been an important part of 
Kufuor’s agenda from the start, but only came to fruition at the end of his second 
term with the passing of the National Pensions Act (Act 766) of 2008. The 
legislation, which introduced the new ‘three-tier’ pensions system, only came into 
force in 2009, after the NDC’s election victory. The reforms were the result of an 
extensive process, with perhaps the most significant the appointment of a 
Presidential Commission on Pensions in 2004, under the chairmanship of T.A. 
Bediako (NPRA, 2010). This Commission published its report in March 2006, 
forming the basis of the legislation eventually passed in 2008 (see GoG, 2006; 
Kpessa, 2011f). The most significant element of the proposals contained in the 
Commission’s report was the creation of the mandatory ‘second tier’ and 
                                         
6 Interview, Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 November 2014. 
7 Members are classified as ‘active’, ‘inacive’ or ‘retirees’. Active members are those that have 
consistently contributed over the previous two years. 
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voluntary ‘third tier’ – the latter aimed at attracting informal sector workers. It 
had consulted with representatives of the informal sector (including groups like 
the Ghana Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association, and the Greater Accra 
Markets Association) in order to solicit the views of the sector (The Statesman, 
2009). Proposals with respect to the third tier were aimed at addressing barriers 
considered important in preventing informal sector workers from joining the 
SSNIT, including lack of awareness and burdensome administrative procedures. 
 
The Government accepted most of the recommendations and published a White 
Paper in July 2006 (NPRA, 2010). The key reform was the addition of two private 
‘tiers’ to the existing partially-funded ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ social insurance scheme 
in the form of SSNIT introduced in 1992. Apart from minor reforms, SSNIT was 
kept intact and, the Cap 30 unfunded scheme closed to new entrants and two 
private sector pension tiers introduced (Kpessa, 2011f: 129). One of these two 
additional private tiers was mandatory, with required membership and 
contributions from all those formally employed. The other was voluntary, aimed 
to facilitate both voluntary additional retirement savings by formal sector workers 
and providing access to retirement savings for informal sector workers (Republic 
of Ghana, 2008).  
 
This resulted in the three tiers consisting of the first, defined-benefit and 
effectively state-underwritten SSNIT (a statutory body which administers the 
first-tier scheme), to which all formal sector employees make mandatory 
contributions (usually in the form of employer-employee contributions) as well as 
voluntary membership for informal sector workers. As a defined-benefit scheme 
it guarantees a certain retirement income as well as death and disability benefits. 
It is solely administered by the statutory body responsible (SSNIT) and is known 
as the national basic social security system. The main parametric reforms 
introduced to the first tier was a total increase in employer-employee social 
insurance contribution rates from 17.5% to 18.5% of income, with the component 
allocated to SSNIT reduced to 11% to free 5% for contributions to the national 
health insurance scheme (Kpessa, 2011f: 130). The second tier is a mandatory 
defined contribution (‘individual account’) based system, which mainly 
formalised existing employer-linked and occupational pension schemes, but now 
gave employees the right to invest a 5% of income component of their mandatory 
social insurance contributions with a service provider of their choice. The third 
tier is a voluntary retirement savings system (defined contribution, and benefits 
usually payable as a lump sum), also in the form of schemes administered by 
private service providers, with tax incentives to encourage participation. The third 
tier was also intended to absorb informal sector workers without access to 




The Act also provided for a new regulatory body – the National Pensions 
Regulatory Authority (NPRA) – with whom all institutional service providers, 
custodians and trustees were to be registered and licenced. It is notable, however, 
that the NPRA has suffered from serious capacity constraints, and continues to do 
so, calling into question the risks associated with investing retirement savings in 
the second and third tiers of the reformed pensions system.8 Kpessa (2011f: 133-
134) points out a number of regulatory weaknesses and argues that mandatory and 
voluntary retirement savings accounts “without any mechanism to ensure 
guaranteed income replacement in the event of market failure or default by service 
providers not only exposes its senior citizens to serious retirement income security 
risks, but also stands the risk of future social upheavals.” The NPRA has, 
however, undertaken significant efforts to improve its capacity and limit the 
proliferation and improve surveillance of service providers,9 and has also received 
financial assistance to the tune of US$2.4 million from Switzerland in this respect 
(Embassy of Switzerland, 2014). 
 
The attempt to cater for the special needs of the informal sector in the third tier of 
the pension system are not widely deemed a success. The NPRA states: “Provision 
has been made in the third-tier voluntary personal pension scheme of the new 
three-tier pension scheme, to cater for the peculiar needs of workers in the 
informal sector of the economy who constitute the majority of workers in the 
country. The informal sector workers will elect to contribute any amount they can 
afford on monthly or regular basis.” These savings would go into separate 
accounts, one providing for monthly benefits paid upon retirement and the second 
a “personal savings account” that would pay out a lump sum upon retirement 
(NPRA, undated). The NPRA further does not publish (as far as the author could 
determine) figures on the number of tier-three schemes and their membership in 
the informal sector. The director of HelpAge Ghana’s assessment of the reforms 
was that it had benefitted formal sector workers primarily, despite the intensions 
behind the third tier schemes: 
 
‘In terms of policy intensions, they are quite adequate. In terms of 
impact, they are very limited. … The pension reforms are for those who 
are in the formal sector, mainly, because the capacity of SSNIT … to 
reach out to people in the informal sector was not good. … The pension 
trust [SSNIT] could not convince people to come on board, and that has 
been the issue’ (Interview, Ebenezer Adjetey-Sorsey, 7 November 
2014). 
 
                                         
8 Interviews, Ernest Amertey-Vondee, 12 November 2014 and Magnus Ebo Duncan, 31 
October 2014. 
9 Interview, Ernest Amertey-Vondee, 12 November 2014. 
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The pension reforms are notable for their ambitious nature and relatively unique 
(for Sub-Saharan Africa) hybrid public-private nature. Although coverage of the 
population remains low (owing to small numbers of informal sector workers 
joining the voluntary schemes), they do represent a vision for a comprehensive 
pensions system that reaches a substantial portion of the population as well as 
developmental aspirations in that they were partially intended to develop local 
capital markets and unlock capital for private sector investment. The nature of the 
reforms raise the question – formulated in the introduction and returned to later – 
of why such a strong focused was placed on social insurance in Ghana’s welfare 
reforms and why social assistance in the form of a universal old-age pension 
(social pension) never appeared to seriously enter the policy agenda. 
 
Dr Akoto-Osei describes the presidential commitment to pursuing both pension 
system and wage reforms during the NPP’s period in power, in the face of fears 
from civil servants and others that their pension benefits would be eroded and a 
host of other impediments. He further notes that cross-party consensus emerged 
on the reforms, so that it survived the transition of 2008. He explains, 
 
‘At the time we had opted for the HIPC [Highly Indebted Poor Country 
initiative, which required PRSPs and macroeconomic reforms], so you 
could not just implement policies outside the programme. To qualify 
for the full benefits under HIPC we had to accede to an [International 
Monetary] Fund programme, and there were constraints under the Fund 
programme as to what you could do. …. So he said, as soon as we get 
out of the programme we can begin reforms. The focus was on social 
protection programmes that could give effect to his objectives. That was 
the beginning of the ‘single spine’ salary policy and the pension 
reforms. 
… 
Once [President Kufuor] accepted the recommendations of the 
[Presidential Commission on Pensions in 2006], we moved onto the 
path of legislation to actualise it. … At this time, he is about to exit, so 
he said “before I go, these two reforms must be put into law”. So both 
the wage reforms and pension reforms led to two separate Acts. … Even 
though he knew he was exiting he was focused on making sure that at 
least the appropriate legislation was in place. … Unfortunately both of 
them materialised towards the end of the term, in 2008. … The new 
government adopted both the wage reform and the pension reform. 
There was no doubt, because the discussions that led to the legislation 





Indeed the NDC government after 2008 has not deviated substantially from the 
direction set by the recommendations of the Presidential Commission, and only 
minor parametric reforms have been made in the interim. A recent example is Act 
833 of 2015, which reduced the age by which a member of the SSNIT scheme 
must join a second-tier scheme (the “age of exemption”) from 55 to 50 years of 
age (NPRA, 2015). 
 
What is perhaps most notable about these pension reforms is that while they 
attempted (apparently somewhat unsuccessfully) to facilitate voluntary retirement 
savings from informal sector workers, a minimal social pension appears never to 
have seriously featured on the national agenda. Informants interviewed for this 
research indicated that such a proposal had never been seriously considered, and 
many seemed taken aback by the question. Most informants in Ghanaian policy-
making circles saw the poverty-targeted conditional LEAP cash transfer 
programme as the natural way to address poverty among the aged. When asked 
why a social pension has not been seriously considered in Ghana, Adjetey-Sorsey 
of HelpAge Ghana pointed out that a “guaranteed pension” had been 
contemplated during the Presidential Commission’s work, but that the proposal 
had not gained traction, and the notion of social pensions still had not: 
 
‘… The Government reject it. … [They had a] de-linking type of 
approach. [Indicating the attitude of the government:] That process will 
come…But the LEAP is also there, and it’s for people without pension. 
Anybody who is extremely poor, is also being taken care of. … We are 
not talking about it – well, policy-makers are not talking about it. We 
as an organisation are talking about it, we are advocating for a universal 
pension’ (Interview, Ebenezer Adjetey-Sorsey, 7 November 2014). 
 
It appears therefore that the anxiety about old-age poverty and the breakdown in 
inter-generational kin support to the elderly discernible in the published academic 
literature of the 1990s and 2000s, and expressed by organisations such as 
HelpAge, had not significantly impacted on policy thinking around pensions in 
Ghana. Poverty among the elderly was primarily seen as a measure to be 
addressed through more general social assistance measures. A common response 
from informants when asked about social pensions was that such a scheme would 
be unaffordable. The discourse around pensions in Ghana stands in stark contrast 
to that in other parts of the continent – in particular East and Southern Africa. 
South Africa (and its former colony, Namibia) and Mauritius are exceptional in 
that they are upper-middle-income countries with unusual postcolonial histories 
(see, for example, Seekings, forthcoming on Mauritius and Seekings, 2002; 2006; 
2008 on South Africa). But Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have in recent 
years implemented social pensions (see Granvik, 2015) and in Uganda the social 
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protection discourse revolves almost exclusively around social pensions (see 
Grebe, 2014; Grebe and Mubiru, 2014). 
 
 
3.2 From ‘cash and carry’ healthcare to national 
health insurance 
 
A second major social insurance reform introduced under President Kufuor’s NPP 
administration was the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), to replace the 
so-called ‘cash-and-carry’ health system, in which all health services (including 
those rendered in public facilities) carried point-of-care user charges. The 
National Health Insurance Scheme was launched in 2003 as a contributory 
scheme. It purportedly aimed to provide basic healthcare to all Ghanaians (as 
reflected in the language of the legislation itself). It is notable that Ghana opted 
for a national health insurance scheme, rather than free primary healthcare or a 
similar ‘abolition of user fees’ model, as many other Anglophone African 
countries had done.  
 
Agyepong and Adjei (2008: 157) argue that the major driver of this reform was a 
perceived need among high-level political decision-makers to deliver on an 
election promise (that the NPP had made before the 2000 elections) before the 
2004 election. The proposal was reportedly popular among ‘the public’ and 
consequently attracted cross-party support. Agyepong and Adjei further argue that 
a pre-existing technocratic agenda existed to improve health-sector performance 
and that bureaucrats saw the sense of political urgency around a major policy 
platform as an opportunity to bring about reform that would not otherwise be 
viable. However, 
 
‘[Bureaucrats] were aware of the technical issues, difficulties and 
challenges of developing and implementing a viable NHIS. It appears, 
however, that they were slower to fully discern the political concerns, 
climate, influences and policy characteristics, their importance, and 
how to create appropriate space to manoeuvre to steer policy in the 
desired technical direction within them’ (Agyepong and Adjei, 
2008: 158). 
 
The scheme was established by the National Health Insurance Act (Act 650 of 
2003), which stated the aim of the establishment of the scheme as “provide[ing] 
basic healthcare services to persons resident in the country through mutual and 
private health insurance schemes unable to afford private insurance.” The Act 
provided for a statutory body, the National Health Insurance Council (later 
renamed Authority, NHIA) to administer the NHIS. Technically, the NHIS was a 
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centrally administered composite scheme, allowing for country-wide acceptance 
of semi-autonomous schemes. The three types of scheme were provided for in the 
Act: district-wide mutual health insurance schemes, private mutual health 
insurance schemes and private commercial health insurance schemes. In practice 
the NHIS is administered centrally and the commercial health insurance industry 
is small. 
 
It is financed by the premiums of subscribers, a National Health Insurance Levy 
(i.e. a 2.5% sales tax on certain goods and services), deductions from formal sector 
employees through their social security contributions, a portion of which (2.5% 
of income)10 is diverted to the NHIS with the bulk going to the SSNIT-
administered basic social security scheme. The scheme also receives direct 
subsidies from the fiscus (Abebrese, 2011). The NHIS therefore had a complex 
financing model, with a special tax, the establishment of a national health fund 
(initially funded out of HIPC-related savings on debt servicing), which in turn 
subsidised district mutual health schemes, and employer-employee contributions 
with a portion of social security contributions previously levied as SSNIT diverted 
to health insurance as well as direct membership premiums raised by the various 
mutual funds. The pension system reforms of 2008 occasioned further parametric 
reforms in the financing model. 
 
While primarily a contributory social insurance scheme, certain categories of 
members were exempt from premiums from the start, and it can therefore be 
argued that it had a substantial social assistance component. Subsection 34(3) of 
the Act contemplated that regulations would exempt certain categories of person 
from premiums to district mutual health insurance schemes. Other subsections 
prescribed specifically that pensioners receiving pensions from, and those who 
were contributing at least the amount equal to the premium they would otherwise 
pay to the health insurance scheme to the Social Security Pension Scheme (the 
basic SSNIT scheme), would be entitled to premium-free minimum benefits 
("National Health Insurance Act (Act 650)," 2003: 11). The regulations 
promulgated after the passing of the Act provided for annual contribution levels 
according to ability to pay with different levels for defined ‘social groupings’ 
defined (in rather vague terms) according to their socio-economic status. Children 
whose parents were paying contributions were exempt from premiums and the 
‘core poor’ – defined as “adults who are unemployed and do not receive any 
identifiable and constant support from elsewhere for survival” were also exempt 
                                         
10 Some of the literature refers to “2.5% of social security contributions” or contributions of 
“2.5%” in an ambiguous way. In fact, 2.5% of income, contributed as part of a total social 
security contribution of 18.5% employers are legally required to remit to the SSNIT (SSNIT, 
undated) is diverted to the NHIS. 
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from premiums.11 In 2008, free membership (premium exemption) was extended 
to pregnant women during their pregnancy and to all children under 18. The most 
recent reported membership (for 2012) indicate a total “active membership”12 of 
8.9 million, of whom more than 50% are premium-exempt children (NHIS, 2013: 
19-20). Both paying and premium-exempt ‘active members’ – i.e. those who were 
registered on the scheme and had biometric membership cards – could attend any 
public healthcare facility or an NHIS-accredited private facility13 (for any 
condition that falls within the ‘basic package’ of coverage) without point-of-care 
charges. Providers then claim from the NHIS. 
 
With Ghana’s total population estimated at 25.8 million (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2014), ‘coverage’ stood at approximately 34%. This contrasts with the 
original objective that within five years every Ghanaian would belong to a health 
insurance scheme guaranteeing equitable access to healthcare (Agyepong and 
Adjei, 2008; Arhin, 2013: 151). The major impediment to access to healthcare 
therefore appeared not to be lack of eligibility (all children, pregnant women, the 
‘core poor’ also referred to as ‘indigents’ and LEAP beneficiaries were eligible 
for free membership), but failure to enrol in the scheme, and – as indicated during 
interviews with LEAP beneficiaries who were enrolled in the NHIS – lack of 
access to health facilities among residents of rural villages).14  
 
The NHIS has been beset by technical and implementation difficulties (Agyepong 
and Adjei, 2008). Schieber, Cashin, Saleh, and Lavado (2012: 111-113) catalogue 
                                         
11 These definitions were obtained from a document without identified author or date, but is 
cited by Abebrese (2011: 9) and available from 
http://img.modernghana.com/images/content/report_content/NHIS.pdf [Retrieved 5 May 
2015]. 
12 ‘Active membership’ refers to ‘paid-up’ members in the case of premium-paying members 
and registered premium-exempt members (which requires yearly renewal of membership). 
Owing to large numbers of ‘enrolled’ members who become ‘inactive’ by failing to renew their 
registration or making contributions, it is common for both the SSNIT and the NHIS to report 
on ‘active membership.’ In the case of the NHIS, ‘active membership’ refers to those currently 
eligible for benefits from the scheme. Large numbers of children nominally eligible for 
premium-free membership are not enrolled and cannot receive free healthcare. In the case of 
SSNIT, ‘inactive’ members may, however, still be entitled to receive certain benefits upon 
retirement. 
13 It should be noted that many private healthcare facilities are not accessible to those without 
the ability to pay ‘out of pocket’. There was by 2014 still a backlog of facility accreditation 
(Interview, O.B. Acheampong, 21 November 2014) and many private providers aimed at 
higher-income Ghanaians opt not to seek accreditation or to accept NHIS patients. 
14 Nyonator, Ofosu, Segbafah, and d'Almeida (2014: 9) highlight that Demographic and Health 
Survey data show an improvement in the proportion of rural residents reporting “distance to 
health facility” as a barrier to accessing healthcare – from 47% in 2003 to 34% in 2008. Among 
the poorest quintile, however, distance to a health facility remained a major problem, with 50% 
reporting distance as a barrier to accessing healthcare. 
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a range of operational and managerial challenges faced by the NHIA, which 
reduced efficiencies and threatened the sustainability of the scheme. The NHIS 
has even been criticised as an inequitable failure (Apoya and Marriott, 2011). 
Similar operational problems, including inadequate human resources, were 
described by the Authority’s Director of Research during an interview.15 Many of 
the problems have been attributed to the fragmentation caused by the 
decentralised nature of the district mutual health schemes model. Solvency of the 
scheme has also been a recurrent worry, with projections in 2010 suggesting 
insolvency as early as 2013 (Schieber et al., 2012: 111) most recently leading to 
a report that the government was working on a ‘bailout’ of the scheme in light of 
outstanding claims of GHS460 million owed by the scheme to providers, by its 
own admission (NHIS, 2015). 
 
The technical difficulties related to fragmentation may have been a significant 
motivation for the reform introduced in 2012, the new National Health Insurance 
Act (Act 852 of 2012), which replaced the 2003 legislation. It abolished the semi-
autonomous district-wide mutual health insurance schemes, consolidating them 
into district offices of the centralised NHIS. This was intended to create a “Single-
Payer System,” which was expected to “inject some efficiency into the operations 
and management (NHIS, 2013: 14). 
 
While the creation and survival of a national health insurance system in Ghana is 
a substantial achievement, it is far from providing universal health coverage, 
which remains a significant concern to policymakers and other stakeholders, and 
health outcomes remain poor in many respects, including maternal and child 
mortality (see Nyonator et al., 2014). 
 
The major social protection reforms pursued during the 8-year period of the NPP 
government were aimed at expansion and improvement of the formal and largely 
contributory social insurance system. It is clear that this was the primary focus of 
the Kufuor administration, and featured much more prominently on the policy 
agenda than did social assistance, despite the introduction of the much-vaunted 
LEAP cash transfer scheme and other programmes described in the next section, 




                                         
15 Interview, O.B. Acheampong (21 November 2014). 
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4. Pro-poor social policy reforms and the 
introduction social assistance schemes (2000-
2014) 
 
The primary focus of this section is on explicit social assistance programmes, 
most notably the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty cash transfer 
scheme. While small (in terms of benefit levels, number of beneficiaries reached, 
and total expenditure), it was nevertheless significant as the first form of direct 
income support and its largely domestically-initiated character. It is important, 
however, that social assistance be seen in the context of broader pro-poor social 
policy, including the perusal of ‘free primary education’ (through the so-called 
‘capitation grant’) and the Ghana School Feeding Programme (aimed at 
addressing both hunger and attaining higher primary school enrolment rates), 
which are seen by policy-makers as part of Ghana’s social protection package, 
and which consume a much larger share of the social expenditure budget. 
 
Like the pension reforms, LEAP was an NPP initiative – announced in 2007, and 
implemented from 2008, not long before the 2008 elections. The timing of several 
of the NPP’s initiatives – the introduction of the NHIS in 2003 and capitation 
grant in 2004 shortly before the 2004 elections –suggests that electoral 
considerations may well have played a role in policy-making. This question is 
considered in greater detail in the companion paper focusing on the politics of 
reform. 
 
These initiatives must further be viewed in the context of a development planning 
process driven to a significant degree by the transnational ‘poverty agenda’ 
reflected in the GPRS and GPRS II, which served as Ghana’s PRSPs under the 
HIPC programme. Like the first, the second iteration of the Ghana Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009) set out a vision of poverty 
eradication through economic growth, envisioning Ghana reaching Middle-
Income status by 2015 and increasing per capita income to US$1,000 (GoG, 
2005). But it also contained a growing recognition of the role of social protection 
(including social assistance) in addressing poverty, possibly reflecting the 
pressure to meet MDG targets and the need to be seen to be making noticeable 







4.1 The National Social Protection Strategy and 
‘flagship’ cash transfer programme (LEAP) 
 
In 2007, a National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) was adopted, which 
attempted to create a policy framework for a national social protection system and 
was framed as a way to achieve Ghana’s MDG goals as well as give effect to the 
vision embodied in GPRS II (MMYE, 2007). It further mentioned the planned 
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme as a flagship 
programme of the strategy, stating that: 
 
‘The NSPS will achieve its poverty reduction goals by implementing 
the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) Social Grants 
scheme that will provide target groups with a reliable and cost-effective 
cash transfer to support their basic human needs. The LEAP programme 
will not only provide a “spring board” to lift or assist beneficiaries to 
“leap” out of their current socio-economic status by improving their 
livelihoods but will assist them to access existing government and 
social services that will provide them with a buffer against various risks 
and shocks. 
 
The LEAP programme will assist targeted groups to become socially 
empowered by increasing their access to education, healthcare, and 
other human services. By supporting beneficiaries with a reliable 
minimum income, the LEAP programme provides basic livelihood 
security and increases the ability of target populations to plan for the 
future. With their basic subsistence secured, the extreme poor will 
become full participants in society and will be free to engage in 
productive activities to support themselves and ultimately contribute to 
national development by reducing the incidence of domestic poverty’ 
(MMYE, 2007: 6). 
 
In light of the relatively small expenditure allocation actually made to the 
programme, this is very ambitious language. Nevertheless, a remarkable feature 
of both the NSPS the LEAP programme is that it was largely a domestic initiative, 
although donors, most prominently DFID, was involved in the design of the 
programme and, as argued above, it was likely to have been influenced greatly by 
the transnational ‘poverty agenda’.  
 
The formulation of the NSPS was led by the Department of Social Welfare (then 
still within the Ministry of Manpower and Youth), but supervised by a Technical 
Working Group comprising representatives from various Ministries (Gender and 
Children’s Affairs, Education, Health, Food and Agriculture, Finance), civil 
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society organisations, with ‘technical and financial support’ provided by UNICEF 
and DFID (MMYE, 2007: 7). A key question is whether the impetus for the 
formulation of the NSPS and the design of its flagship LEAP programme was 
driven primarily by the political leadership of the relevant Ministries, in line with 
broader political objectives, or whether bureaucrats acted relatively 
autonomously. 
 
According to Jerry Odotei, deputy director and head of policy for the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC), who was centrally involved in the 
design process, the social assistance agenda was primarily technocratically-
driven. He argues that the idea emerged from planning and social development 
bureaucrats who were concerned that welfare policies were not reaching the 
poorest. These bureaucrats, including those in the planning commission, had to 
‘sell’ the idea to sceptical politicians, and that the design and approval of LEAP 
can be traced to the identification of extreme poverty as a major impediment to 
development at the end of the implementation period of the first PRSP (GPRS I, 
GoG, 2003a) and specifically, the NDPC-commissioned Poverty Social Impact 
Assessment Study, which was conducted in 2004, as paving the way towards 
focusing policy on ‘vulnerability among the poorest’. 16 The NSPS cites this study 
as well as a range of others, including the United Nations Common Country 
Assessment on Vulnerability and Exclusion (2004) and documents on Social 
Protection interventions by organisations such as the World Food Programme 
(WFP), Action Aid, CARE International, World Vision Ghana, Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS), PLAN Ghana, the World Bank, UNICEF and national Ghana 
Living Standards Surveys (GLSS), Demographic and Health Surveys,  as 
informing the formulation of the strategy (MMYE, 2007: 32). 
 
Odotei argues that this is why the NSPS recognised the need for a flagship 
programme targeting the poorest, especially the rural poor in Northern Ghana, and 
that there existed a great deal of unanimity about who should be considered 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘deserving’ of support. However, he says that 
 
‘This was a difficult proposal for politicians to accept. The chairman of 
the NDPC at the time, Mr J.H. Mensah, who was an economist who had 
worked as an advisor to President Nrumah, felt that this looked like a 
‘handout’ – distributing money to people. He was an old-time 
economist, who didn’t believe in this. But we managed to convince him 
that this was only for the very very poor and that it was a temporary 
measure to lift them out of poverty. 
… 
                                         
16 Interview, Ebenezer Jerry O. Odotei, 28 October 2014. 
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Moving forward [with the proposal] was very difficult, economists 
argued that revenue mobilisation was a big challenge and we 
encountered a lot of resistance. We had to argue that the poor and 
vulnerable were a group that could contribute to the economy if we 
lifted them up. We further packaged LEAP with a set of complementary 
services and conditionalities [e.g. that children must be in school] and 
linked individual upliftment to local economic development’ 
(Interview, Ebenezer Jerry O. Odotei, 28 October 2014). 
 
Frema Osei-Opare, who was at the time the Deputy Minister of Manpower Youth 
and Employment (MMYE) and the Minister of State with responsibility for the 
Department of Social Welfare (DSW) recounts a slightly different version of 
LEAP’s birth, emphasising her role as a political champion of cash transfers, but 
agreeing on the resistance encountered among both fiscally conservative 
technocrats and sections of the political elite.17 (The Department of Social 
Development has subsequently, under the new NDC administration elected in 
2008, been placed under the authority of a newly-created Ministry for Gender, 
Children and Social Protection.) 
 
Osei-Opare explains how her background in social welfare-oriented NGOs had 
given her a strong conviction that social assistance to the poorest was necessary 
and that she had to work hard to convince sceptical politicians (including 
members of the Cabinet and representatives of her party in Parliament) in order 
to secure support and (initially modest) funding for a programme like LEAP. She 
explains that her department prioritised the formulation of a national social 
protection strategy and that it had commissioned a baseline study that identified 
and reviewed a range of microfinance schemes and other social protection 
programmes that served as a resource document for the for development of the 
NSPS (this refers to the review mentioned in MMYE, 2007: 32). This study 
pointed to the erratic way in which social protection had been handled in the past, 
with a range of sector-specific initiatives, for example seed and fertiliser 
programmes in agriculture and microcredit schemes, without linkages between 
the programmes. The DSW had its own programmes for orphans and vulnerable 
children (OVCs), the destitute, child labourers etc., but even these were 
uncoordinated. This highlighted the need in her mind for a comprehensive 
strategy.18 
 
An informal Social Vulnerability Group was assembled that included 
representatives of both government agencies and donors, that despite its informal 
status had significant influence on the development of the social protection 
                                         
17 Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014. 
18 Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014. 
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agenda. A Stakeholder Committee was then assembled, chaired by the Deputy 
Minister for Social Development (Osei-Opare herself) and included 
representatives of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Women and Children’s 
Affairs, Education, the Ministry of Finance, the NDPC and a few NGOs. 
Consultants were appointed to help with the drafting of the document, but she was 
disappointed with the quality of their work (she describes frustration at large 
numbers of meetings being held, but not resulting in high-quality documents) and 
describes “putting my technical hat on” and working directly with a consultants 
to draft the NSPS.19 
 
It is notable that in Osei-Opare’s account, the process was initiated by the political 
leadership in the MMYE, whereas the NDPC’s Jerry Odotei’s saw planning 
bureaucrats as the main drivers of the process. While it is to be expected that actors 
would emphasise their own roles in the formulation of a popular policy perceived 
as a major success, this raises both the question of political and ideological 
agendas vs. technocratic agendas, and the relative agenda-setting powers of 
various sections of the political and bureaucratic elites. This is addressed in the 
companion paper. As in some of the other case studies conducted as part of this 
research, it is likely that intra-bureaucratic wrangling over policy and resource 
allocation was significant (see, for example, Grebe, 2014), and specific political 
champions had substantial influence (see Granvik, 2015), although donors appear 
not to have been as significant in the initiation of cash transfer pilot schemes as in 
countries like Uganda and Zambia (see Seekings and Kabandula, forthcoming, 
Grebe, 2014; Grebe and Mubiru, 2014; Hickey et al., 2009). 
 
Osei-Opare expresses pride in the professionalism displayed in the development 
of the NSPS and the design of LEAP, and credits this with its survival under the 
new NDC government which came to power shortly after its introduction: 
 
‘We did not look at this [social protection and LEAP] from a short-term 
point of view. It was part of a national vision, and NPP vision, but we 
did a lot of work to professionalise the work of the DSW. LEAP was 
professionally designed – the lead consultant was Prof Ellen Bortei 
Doku Aryetey, who is both a local and international consultant. We also 
used people from Brazil, South Africa and Tunisia. It was a 
multicultural team with experience in developing programmes. LEAP 
was the flagship programme of the NSPS intended to act as a conduit 
for also bringing in other social protection initiatives. 
… 
Initially LEAP was bashed by the NDC, but today it is still the flagship 
programme and this is testament to how professionally it was 
                                         
19 Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014. 
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developed.  …Under discussion now as a common targeting mechanism 
and a national benchmark for determining who is poor, who should 
benefit from premium-free membership of the NHIS (and budgeting for 
that gap)’ (Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014). 
 
Other informants in fact confirm that Osei-Opare was a very important champion 
of social assistance within the political elite.20 But Akoto-Osei considers the 
personal commitment of President Kufuor to the programme a more crucial factor. 
He argues that it fitted into the president’s broader vision and that Osei-Opare 
“misunderstood her colleagues [in saying it was difficult to build consensus 
around LEAP within the government].” 
 
‘You can be a champion of only one programme, if you are not careful. 
But there are realistic budget constraints. So if you don’t get ‘X 
amount’, you think your colleagues are not supporting the programme. 
The Minister of Finance must balance priorities, it cannot be the only 
programme. … But in terms of the broader vision, if that was not the 
case, it probably wouldn’t have received cabinet approval’ (Interview, 
Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 November 2014). 
 
He specifically credits Kufuor’s exposure to the Brazilian experience with Bolsa 
Familia for the support LEAP received: 
 
‘The LEAP programme in my view was informed by [President 
Kufuor’s] personal relationship with President Lula of Brazil. So that 
was also in the process. … Given the Brazilian experience, he was 
determined to emulate it within the Ghanaian context. Lula came to 
visit, he went to Brazil, so that was informed by the Brazilian 
experience’ (Interview, Dr. Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 November 2014). 
 
While Brazilian consultants did participate in the design of LEAP –and it shares 
certain characteristics, such as the conditionalities attached to the cash grants - the 
claim of it being an attempt to emulate Bolsa Familia within the Ghanaian context 
is belied by its relatively small scale and low benefit levels (see below). Further, 
claims of Presidential leadership and commitment to the programme and that it 
was part of Kufuor’s ‘vision’ were made by individuals close to the former 
President, such as Akoto-Osei and the current Chief Executive of the Kufuor 
foundation.21 Interviews with both Agyeman-Duah and Kufuor himself painted 
LEAP as a natural element of Kufuor’s ‘capitalism with a heart’ political 
                                         
20 Interviews, Peter Ragno and Sarah Hague (22 October 2014); Joana Kyeremateng (31 
October 2014). 
21 Interview, Prof Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 30 October 2014. 
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ideology, but revealed much greater emphasis on ‘good leadership’ and ‘good 
governance’ than on social protection. The latter appears not to have been opposed 
by the former president, but nor is there evidence that he was personally strongly 
committed to social assistance or considered this a major element of his ‘political 
brand’ or legacy-building efforts. 
 
LEAP implementation started in a trial phase in March 2008, and then began 
expanding gradually in 2009 and 2010, under the new NDC administration, 
eventually reaching about 70,000 households by late 2013 (Handa et al., 2014: 1). 
Eligibility criteria were based on the household being classified as poor and 
having at least one household member from one of three categories of vulnerable 
persons: orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), persons with extreme disability 
and unable to work (PWDs) and the elderly poor. Eligibility was determined by a 
community-based process through which potentially eligible households are 
identified, and then verified using a centralised proxy means test. In recent years 
attempts have been made to improve the efficiency and reliability of the targeting 
and selection process (see next subsection).22 The programme was implemented 
by the Department of Social Welfare, at the time housed in the Ministry of Youth 
and Employment. Significant investments were made in creating the necessary 
bureaucratic capacity to implement the programme and selection of pilot districts 
were based on poverty rankings. It was initially funded primarily from the fiscus, 
with donors coming on board later (including a DFID grant and a World Bank 
loan) so that by 2012, only 50% of the approximately US$20m yearly expenditure 
was financed from general government revenue. In late 2014, an expansion aimed 
at pregnant women and infants was in the final stages of planning, with USAID 
coming on board as a major donor (MoGCSP, UNICEF, and USAID, 2014). 
 
Benefit levels during the first years of the project were very low (between GHS8 
or approximately US$2 and GHS15 or US$3.90 using 2015 exchange rates) per 
household per month, depending on the number of beneficiaries. In 2012, benefit 
levels were tripled. Attempts were made to link the programme to other social 
services, most significantly by providing free membership of the NHIS to 
beneficiaries. 
 
While the introduction of LEAP was therefore a major policy move – specifically 
in that direct income support in the form of cash transfers were introduced, and 
held up as the flagship programme of Ghana’s social protection strategy – it was 
highly parsimonious in terms of both benefit levels and the number of 
beneficiaries enrolled in the scheme. Expansion took place slowly (also under the 
NDC government after 2010, as described in the next subsection), and it does not 
appear to have ever been intended as Ghana’s primary response to poverty. The 
                                         
22 Interview, Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, 12 November 2014. 
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aim was still to ‘grow out of’ poverty, to expand economic opportunities (improve 
the productivity of agriculture, increase investment and growth in the private 
sector, etc.) with LEAP as a mechanism on the one hand intended to respond to 
the most extreme forms of deprivation or ‘destitution’ (somewhat reminiscent of 
the ‘poor law’ tradition in Britain and many former British colonies, especially 
with respect to beneficiaries like the old and disabled who are deemed unable to 
work), and on the other hand as a ‘springboard’ to ‘lift beneficiary households’ 
out of poverty. That is, it was partly intended to directly support the destitute and 
partly to provide extremely poor families that do have some labour capacity with 
resources that would eventually allow them to become sufficiently productive (for 
example by improving their ability to engage in small-scale agriculture, trading 
and related activities) to ‘graduate’ out of poverty. Furthermore, the conditions 
attached to the scheme (which included keeping children in education, enrolment 
in the NHIS and accessing routine healthcare services, including vaccinating 
children), point to the developmental goals of the programme. 
 
 
4.2 An updated NSPS and modest expansion of 
LEAP under the NDC (2008-) 
 
The National Democratic Convention returned to power in 2008, with the election 
of John Atta Mills as president in a close-run election. The election took place 
only months after the launch of the LEAP programme, and initially there was 
some talk of the LEAP programme being scrapped, but in fact it was rather 
enthusiastically embraced by the NDC government, especially after the creation 
of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, and the appointment 
of a respected human rights lawyer, Nana Oye Lithur, as the responsible Minister. 
The Department of Social Welfare, which houses the LEAP implementation unit, 
was incorporated under this new Ministry in what many have regarded has a sign 
of high-level political support both for social protection in general and cash 
transfers and the LEAP programme in particular. A pamphlet produced by the 
Government itself puts it as follows: 
 
‘In January 2013, the government of Ghana underscored the importance 
of social protection in its poverty reduction efforts by the restructuring 
the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, which subsequently 
emerged as the Minsitry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 
(MoGCSP). The new Ministry is charged with new primary 
responsibilities: it has the mandate to coordinate all social protection 
interventions across multiple implementing agencies, as well as 
implementing the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
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programme, which is the flagship programme of the National Social 
Protection Strategy’ (MoGCSP, 2014c). 
 
The same pamphlet goes on to list LEAP, the NHIS, free school uniforms and 
exercise books, the Ghana School Feeding Programme, the Capitation Grant and 
Labour Intensive Public Works as the main social protection programmes 
(MoGCSP, 2014c: 2). As late as 2013, however, some voices in the ruling party 
were calling for the programme to be cancelled, with the NDC MP for Nandom, 
Murtala Mohammed, suggesting that “the LEAP programme cannot reduce 
poverty by giving cash hand-outs to the poor and the vulnerable in society” (Peace 
FM Online, 2013), showing that there didn’t exist complete unanimity in the 
party, just as there hadn’t been in the NPP.  
 
The National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS), which had originally been 
produced in 2007 (MMYE, 2007) – and of which envisaged LEAP as its flagship 
programme – was revised in 2012 (MESW, 2012) by the then-Ministry of 
Employment and Social Welfare and now became known as the Ghana National 
Social Protection Strategy (GNSPS). It does not depart greatly in spirit from its 
predecessor, mainly concerned with improving targeting, implementation and 
coordination, and recommended a common targeting mechanism (which later 
underwent significant development and is discussed later in this section). Its 
flagship programme remained LEAP and it did not envision any radical changes 
to the contributory social security system. The strategy’s (and by extension, the 
NDC government’s) commitment to LEAP is demonstrated in its setting of a 
‘short-term’ target to “extend LEAP cash transfer to poorest 20% poorest 
households in Ghana (960,000)” (MESW, 2012: 105) and in the very optimistic 
wording of its foreword, which states: 
 
‘One of the key innovations in the portfolio of social protection 
activities in Ghana at the moment is the Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (LEAP) Social Grants scheme. LEAP was launched in 
2008… It provides target groups with a reliable and cost-effective cash 
transfer or stipend to support their basic human needs. The LEAP 
programme not only serves as a ‘spring board’ for beneficiaries to ‘leap’ 
out of poverty, but assists targeted groups to become socially 
empowered by increasing their access to education, healthcare, and 
other basic social services. With their basic subsistence secured, 
extremely poor will become full participants in society and will be free 
to engage in productive activities to support themselves and ultimately 
contribute to national development by reducing the incidence of 




The wording above is also notable for its presentation of LEAP as not simply a 
form of assistance to the extremely poor, but as a developmental intervention with 
the potential to ‘lift the poor out of poverty’ and to ‘contribute to national 
development’. This is echoed in other publications, for example, a fact sheet on 
LEAP and economic growth, which states that “the programme effectively 
channelled cash into the local economy by increasing the purchasing power of 
beneficiary families”. It further cites studies to support the claim that beneficiary 
families spend 80% of their income in the local economy, a 0.27 multiplier effect 
on crop production and 0.78 in the retail sector (MoGCSP, 2014a).23 The 
discursive framing of social protection (and cash transfers in particular) in Ghana 
appears to draw both on ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘developmental’ discourses. 
However, unlike for example Uganda (see Grebe, 2014), this no longer appears 
to reflect an attempt to ‘sell’ social assistance to a sceptical elite, among which 
significant consensus exists. 
 
Under the NDC government in power since December 2008, the LEAP 
programme was substantially expanded – although it continued to fall far short of 
the stated goal of reaching the poorest 20% of households. By the end of 2012, 
the number of households receiving benefits had reached 73,304, with 214,115 
eligible household members (ILO, 2014: 26). An evaluation conducted over a 24-
month period between April 2010 and 2012 concluded that implementation had 
been inconsistent (with households only receiving 20 months’ payments over the 
period), that the programme had only a modest impact on secondary school 
enrolment rates (7 percentage points), despite a large increase in NHIS enrolment 
– no impact on curative care seeking but an increase in preventive care-seeking 
among children and mixed impacts on mortality, and essentially no impact on 
consumption, but increases in the likelihood of holding savings and some 
agricultural productivity impacts (Handa et al., 2014). These findings were 
disappointing, but the study was conducted before the tripling of benefits and 
appear not to have reduced political, bureaucratic or donor enthusiasm for the 
programme, as was evident from interviews with informants in all of these 
categories. An operational assessment of the programme, conducted by the same 
team, found broad satisfaction with the programme, but widely varying views on 
who within households benefited most and large differences between male and 
female-headed households in who made expenditure decisions (Park et al., 2012). 
 
In 2014, an expansion of the LEAP programme was announced with financial and 
technical support from USAID. Known as LEAP 1000, the expansion is 
                                         
23 It should be noted that these claims about the multiplier effect of the cash transfer are 
controversial. The results of a modelling exercise published by the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organisation found that the theoretical potential total income multiplier of LEAP was GHS2.50 
per GHS1 in benefits paid (in nominal terms), the grant may have an inflationary effect, which 
may result in a true income multiplier as low as GHS1.50 (FAO, 2013). 
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specifically targeted at pregnant women and children below the age of one year 
in families living in extreme poverty, and was to be piloted in selected districts in 
the Northern and Upper East Regions (MoGCSP et al., 2014). It was primarily 
aimed at improving maternal and child health outcomes through better nutrition 
and access to healthcare, by awarding increased cash grants to households with 
these newly-eligible members.24 
 
Despite the modest impacts on household consumption and other outcomes 
measured in the LEAP evaluation (Handa et al., 2014), LEAP beneficiaries on the 
whole appear to be very satisfied with the programme, especially with the service 
and treatment by paypoint staff and LEAP representatives, as well as only 5% of 
respondents in the operational evaluation reporting ever having paid a bribe to 
staff (Park et al., 2012: iii). Beneficiaries further reported overwhelmingly that 
the transfer is used to purchase food, health, and education, and a majority (77%) 
felt that the entire household benefits from the transfer (Park et al., 2012: 13).  
 
These findings fit with a series of individual and focus-group-style interviews 
conducted by the author with community representatives and LEAP beneficiaries 
in the East Mamprosi district of North-Eastern Ghana in November 2014.25 
During these conversations both beneficiaries and community leaders expressed 
satisfaction with the programme, indicated that it had made a great difference to 
the poorest members of community, and almost uniformly insisted that the 
community-based selection process was fair and effective in identifying the most 
needy families. Even non-beneficiaries interviewed in villages included in the 
programme appeared to be satisfied that the benefits were fairly allocated and not 
being abused for clientalistic purposes by either regional LEAP staff or local 
community leaders. It should be noted, however, that few of these interviews were 
conducted without LEAP representatives and/or community leaders being 
present, and it is possible that interviewees would not have felt comfortable to 
point out any manipulative practices. The main problems identified by community 
members were irregular transfers – although these had improved substantially in 
the year before the interviews were conducted. When asked about their most 
serious problems, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries largely pointed to problems 
related to their agricultural livelihoods (lack of implements, supposedly 
subsidised inputs like fertiliser not reaching them or being only intermittently 
available, access to potable water and sanitation – and water for irrigation, as well 
as distances to the nearest schools and health facilities rendering the transport 
costs associated with using these social services beyond their means). Their 
complaints were therefore not with the LEAP programme itself – of which they 
                                         
24 Interviews, Sarah Hague and Peter Ragno, 22 October 2014). 
25 Interviews and community group discussions were held in Buipe (a non-LEAP village), 
Namasu and Zarantinga villages in East Mamprosi district on 16 and 17 November 2014. 
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were tremendously appreciative – but with their ability to fully actualise the 
benefits it is supposed to bring in accessing other services. It should also be noted 
that a number of individuals living in clearly extremely poor families (reporting, 
for example, eating on average fewer than one meal per day) in the non-LEAP 
village of Buipe had never heard of the LEAP programme. The process of 
selecting beneficiary villages seemed opaque to respondents, while in those 
villages included in the programme interviewees were generally satisfied that the 
combined community-based and central proxy means test-based household 
selection process worked efficiently and fairly. The Acting District Welfare 
Director responsible for LEAP implementation in the district identified the limit 
on the number of villages that could be included in the programme, logistical 
problems related to funds transfer to the local Post Office branch and collection 
of cash, the rising risk of heists during cash transportation and difficulties in 
reaching remote villages (often only accessible by motorcycle) as main 
impediments to the improved functioning of the programme.26 On the whole, staff 
and volunteers working in the district appeared committed, professional and 
showed no signs of political alignment or reported any political interference at the 
local, regional or national levels.27 
 
In general, it appeared that many reported beneficiaries had not received payments 
at the time of the evaluation, calling into question the integrity of the beneficiary 
database (Park et al., 2012: 13). Operational problems were being actively and 
relatively effectively addressed, according to the officials involved, by late 2014. 
Measures included improvements in data management and work towards 
implementation of the national common targeting mechanism. The Management 
of the LEAP implementation unit and the Director of Social Protection seemed 
very aware of the problems and reported substantial progress in addressing 
implementation challenges, including through technical assistance received from 
DFID and UNICEF, which allowed for improvements in both the targeting 
methodology and the database of beneficiary households.28 
 
The LEAP programme remains small relative to the number of households living 
in extreme poverty, with many poor districts (and many poor villages within 
targeted districts) remaining excluded from the programme. Despite the successes 
in linking cash transfers and social insurance (LEAP beneficiaries were entitled 
to free NHIS membership and most had been enrolled), health insurance remains 
very low nationally (around one third of the population). Health service usage 
rates and health outcomes among LEAP beneficiaries were below what might be 
                                         
26 Interview, Musah Abdul-Majeed, 16 November 2014. 
27 Interviews, Musah Abdul-Majeed (16 November 2014) and Zulai Alhassan (17 November 
2014). 
28 Interviews, William Niyuni (10 November 204), Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu (12 November 
2014) and Mawutor Ablo (12 November 2014). 
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expected of a successfully integrated intervention – largely owing to deficiencies 
in the public healthcare system, leaving even beneficiaries with active NHIS 
memberships unable to access services (Handa et al., 2014). The target of 
reaching the poorest 20% of households in Ghana with cash transfers was a long 
way from being reached. It would appear that the main constraints on expansion 
of LEAP and the number of beneficiaries are neither in operational nor managerial 
or even local implementation capacity, but rather simply a question of additional 
fiscal resources being made available. It further seems – both from the impact 
evaluation and interviews with beneficiaries – that linkages between different 
social protection initiatives remains a major issue. In the next section the question 
of fiscal space for the expansion of cash transfers, as well as the opportunities 
identified for the ‘rationalisation’ of social protection interventions and 
expenditure in Ghana are addressed in greater detail. 
 
 
4.3 Child-focused social protection: free primary 
education and school feeding 
 
Another important pro-poor initiative was the new ‘Capitation Grant’ (CP) 
introduced in 2004. This amounted to a school fee abolition policy aimed at 
attaining the ‘universal access to basic education’ goal articulated in the GPRS II 
(Ampratwum and Armah-Attoh, 2010c) as well as the universal primary 
education MDG. The CP programme consists of grants to public basic (primary) 
schools (initially in poor districts) in lieu of school fee income, to enable the 
abolition of school registration fees by these schools. While Ghana had in place a 
policy of free compulsory basic education supported by the World Bank’s Primary 
School Development Project since 1995, the programme was deemed a failure 
with 50% of children aged 6-11 remaining out of school by 2003 (Ampratwum 
and Armah-Attoh, 2010c: 2). The capitation grant was expanded to all registered 
public primary schools in the 2005/6 academic year, with a fixed amount 
transferred from the Ministry of Financed per enrolled child via the Ghana 
Education Service to District Education Offices and finally to schools based on 
their enrolment figures. 
 
The capitation grant programme was beset by operational problems, specifically 
“leakages” of funding, defined as differences between resources transferred at a 
higher level (such as between funds transferred to District Education Offices and 
those transferred to beneficiary schools), as revealed by the Ghana Statistical 
Service’s Public Expenditure Tracking Survey conducted in 2007 (see 
Ampratwum and Armah-Attoh, 2010a; Ampratwum and Armah-Attoh, 2010c; 
Ampratwum, Armah-Attoh, and Ashon, 2012). Primary school enrolment rates 
have been rising, with the capitation grant cited as a major contributing factor 
35 
 
(see, for examaple, Akyeampong et al., 2007), although the latter study also found 
that the per capita expenditure on each child in primary education had not 
increased substantially, and Ampratwum and Armah-Attoh (2010a: 47-48) found 
that in a sample of surveyed schools, the increase in enrolment had been 
associated with a rise in teacher-pupil ratios and a decline in educational quality. 
 
The Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) was launched in 2005, with the 
stated long-term goal of contributing to poverty-reduction and food security. 
Further, it was designed as part of Ghana’s efforts to meet the Millennium 
Development Goal targets on hunger, poverty and universal primary education 
(Abdulai, 2014a: 277). The GSFP initially launched in a small number of pilot 
schools, but by 2013 claimed total enrolment of more than 1.7 million children in 
2013 (MLGRD, undated). An official Government of Ghana pamphlet described 
the programme as a “development strategy”, listed its main objectives as being to 
reduce hunger and malnutrition, improve school enrolment, retention, and 
educational performance, and increase domestic food production (MLGRD, 
undated). It further states that the GSFP is 
 
‘…part of the Government of Ghana’s efforts to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals 1 & 2, which talk about eradicating extreme hunger 
and poverty and achieving Universal Primary Education. Accordingly 
the Development Goal of the GSFP is to enhance food security and 
reduce poverty’ (MLGRD, undated). 
 
The CP and GSFP therefore can be thought of as a two-pronged strategy to 
increase primary school enrolment and simultaneously reduce hunger and 
malnutrition among primary school-aged children (with the hope of some spin-
off benefits to local economies and communities dependent on agriculture). 
Despite these stated goals of both the GSFP and CP, Abdulai (2014a; 2014c) 
shows how both programmes were politicised, particularly with respect to 
spending allocations. Both the NPP government which introduced the schemes 
and the later NDC government appeared to favour certain regions in per capita 
spending allocations, inconsistent with stated developmental and poverty 
targeting goals. For example, he demonstrates disproportionate government 
expenditures on education in Vola and Ashanti, by the NDC and NPP 
governments respectively (Abdulai, 2014c: 41).29 This ‘clientelistic’ or 
‘patromonialist’ dimension to distributional outcomes in Ghanaian social 
protection policy and resource allocation is explored further in the companion 
paper. 
                                         
29 Notably, he does not attribute these disproportional expenditures to “simply a function of the 
‘reward the loyal supporter strategy’,” but rather to “relationship between the regional 
distribution of political power at the level of elites and the distribution of public goods at the 
mass level” (Abdulai, 2014c: 41-42). 
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6. Institutionalising a social protection system? 
The ‘rationalisation’ study, national targeting 
mechanism and fiscal constraints 
 
6.1 The ILO-led social protection rationalisation 
study: towards institutionalisation of a ‘social 
protection floor’? 
 
A major social protection ‘rationalisation’ study was undertaken in 2010, largely 
under the direction of the International Labour Organisation with the aim of 
“support[ing] Ghana to rationalise its social protection expenditure … analys[ing] 
that expenditure in terms of its sustainability, robustness, efficiency and 
effectiveness in preventing or reducing poverty, social exclusion and ill health” 
(ILO, 2014: 2-3). The report is widely cited in policy circles as providing guidance 
in harmonising social protection schemes, reducing fragmentation and improving 
linkages between programmes so as to improve the ‘efficiency’ of social 
protection expenditure. 
 
Ghana’s social protection policy is ostensibly governed by an overarching policy 
framework in the form of the National Social Protection Strategy. This was 
published under the NPP in 2007 (MMYE, 2007) and later revised under the NDC 
(MESW, 2012). However, despite the existence of this strategy, coordination of 
social protection initiatives has been judged weak. In order to address this, a 
number of initiatives have been undertaken, including updating the social 
protection strategy, an ILO-supported review of social protection initiatives in line 
with the latter’s social protection floor initiative and the development of a 
harmonised targeting framework. The draft report on the ILO’s review exercise 
states 
 
‘Stronger emphasis on social protection has however been associated 
with an increase in the number of activities, projects and programmes 
related to social protection, which leads to duplication and a 
fragmentation of the social protection system. The government efforts 
to develop a [new] national social protection strategy is a key step to 
improving the coordination, effectiveness and efficiency of the social 
protection system, and it is hoped that this report can support the 
government in defining a coherent strategy that sets out a strong vision, 
clear objectives and concrete milestones and indicators of how to 




This exercise followed and was intended to complement an assessment of the 
major social protection programmes in Ghana, focusing on benefit incidence and 
targeting performance, conducted by the World Bank in 2012 (World Bank, 
2012a). The rationalisation study and its findings, which appeared as fieldwork 
was being conducted for this research, was considered by a range of informants 
as extremely significant in setting the tone for the future of social protection policy 
in Ghana. A key finding of the rationalisation study was that coverage of social 
protection programmes remained low. For example, it points out that only 10% of 
people over 65 years receive an old-age pension through SSNIT or are covered 
by LEAP (although with perfect targeting and countrywide expansion LEAP 
could cover up to 30% of older people) and that only about one third of the 
population is insured under the NHIS. It concludes about coverage gaps: 
 
‘Closing the coverage gaps in the social protection floor means 
mobilizing additional fiscal space. Experience has shown that, as 
countries increase the share of the state budget spent on social 
protection, they generate more inclusive and more sustainable 
economic growth. At the same time, the Government has to maximize 
the impact of the resources spent. The analysis [in this report] suggests 
that a rationalization of social expenditure protection can be achieved 
by improving the administration and implementation structures of the 
various programmes and by exploring synergies and cost-saving 
opportunities of economies of scale that can be obtained by focusing on 
activities that all the programmes have in common. This has already 
been initiated through the development of a common targeting 
mechanism, but further activities with a potential for collaboration and 
cost-saving should be thoroughly investigated, including … 
membership and database management … [and] benefit delivery 
mechanisms’ (ILO, 2014: 100). 
 
In terms of fiscal space, the study’s major findings were encouraging. It 
highlighted that total expenditure on social protection (which includes the NHIS 
indigent exemption, capitation grants and school uniforms subsidies, the GSFS, 
LEAP, the National Youth Employment Programme and Labour-Intensive Public 
Works schemes) amounted to only 0.5% of GDP in 2013 (2% of government 
revenue) and 21.5% of spending on poverty reduction in 2012 (ILO, 2014: 116). 
It further argued that social protection programmes should be re-prioritised within 
the poverty-related expenditure portfolio and that the termination of energy 






6.2 The ‘fiscal crisis’ and negotiations with the IMF: 
a ‘fiscal ceiling’ on social protection expenditure? 
 
In 2014, shortly after the conclusion of the social protection ‘rationalisation’ 
exercise, a relatively opaque process of negotiations with the IMF was taking 
place, aimed at reaching agreement on a package of macroeconomic and fiscal 
reforms that would unlock IMF loans and allow the NDC government to deal with 
a growing fiscal crisis. The budget deficit approached 12% of GDP in 2012, 
largely blamed on a new salary structure which hugely increased the state’s wage 
bill (Cooke et al., 2014). In August 2014, the Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF released a statement announcing that discussions on a reform package would 
begin with Ghana: 
 
‘Today, IMF Management received a formal request from the Ghanaian 
authorities to initiate discussions on an economic program that could be 
supported by the IMF. The Fund stands ready to help Ghana address the 
current economic challenges it is facing. We expect to send an IMF 
team to Ghana in early September to initiate discussions on a program’ 
(IMF, 2014b). 
 
The large budget deficits had already necessitated a number of fiscal reforms, 
including the removal of fuel subsidies over the first half of 2013, which led to 
the prices of petrol, kerosene, diesel, marine diesel (a particularly important input 
cost for subsistence fishers) and other fuels increasing by between 15% and 50% 
(Cooke et al., 2014: 5). While wage subsidies are inherently regressive, the poor 
were seen as least able to cope with the impact on the cost of living and this seems 
to have provided an impetus for investment in the LEAP programme, which was 
seen as an effective and efficient manner to reach the poorest.30 As the concluding 
paragraph of UNICEF’s analysis of the impact of the fuel subsidy reform puts it: 
 
‘In sum, the reform of fuel prices in Ghana appears to be a welcome 
policy reform allowing the Government to reduce its growing fiscal 
deficit and to reduce excessively regressive expenditures. However the 
poor and vulnerable would be negatively affected by the reforms and 
are the least able to cope. The impact of increased fuel prices … is to 
reduce household consumption… As their costs rise, [poor] households 
are typically forced to spend less on education, health and nutrition. … 
As highlighted by the Government of Ghana, this negative impact could 
be mitigated by scaling up Ghana’s national cash transfer programme 
LEAP that directly targets the poorest households’ (Cooke et al., 2014: 
23) 
                                         




Nevertheless, the fiscal crisis continued relatively unabated, with the fiscal deficit 
placed at 9.2% of GDP in the first half of 2014, again blamed largely on the high 
wage bill as well as rising interest costs (with interest payments at 5% of GDP) as 
well as only very modest increases in tax revenue (World Bank, 2014a: 2). The 
fiscal deficit represented a substantial threat to the fiscal space available for the 
expansion of social protection, and in particular social assistance. As the 
fieldwork for this research was being conducted, the Government of Ghana was 
in talks with the International Monetary Fund over assistance and reforms to 
address its macroeconomic problems, with IMF missions to Ghana taking place 
in September and November of 2014 and discussions ongoing (IMF, 2014a). It 
was reported that the IMF had signalled support for social protection and that 
programmes like LEAP would be safe from contractions in government 
expenditure.31 It was, however, too early to tell what the impact of an agreed 
reform programme might be on the future direction of LEAP and social 
expenditure in general. 
 
 
6.3 The development of a national poverty-targeting 
system 
 
The topic of a ‘common targeting mechanism’ (now known as the National 
Targeting System) was raised by a large number of informants, and enjoyed 
significant momentum within bureaucratic circles. It was seen as being promoted 
primarily by the World Bank (following the Bank’s 2012 review), but also 
enjoyed significant buy-in from other donor agencies as well as social protection 
bureaucrats. The purpose of such a mechanism would be to harmonise the 
targeting of vulnerable and poor families across social protection programmes and 
thereby enhance both complementarities and improve the efficiency of targeting.32 
The National Targeting System was still in development in late 2014, after five 
ministries (the MESW/MoGCSP and the Ministries of Health, Education and 
Agriculture and Local Government) agreed in 2009 to devise the system 
“recognising that the absence of data on poor households can limit the 
effectiveness and efficiency of pro-poor interventions” and identifying as a key 
step the development of a national registry of households with data on living 
conditions (MoGCSP, 2014b). This envisioned household registry was reported 
by informants to be the most difficult aspect of the development of the common 
                                         
31 Interviews, Sarah Hague and Peter Ragno, 22 October 2014. 
32 Interview, Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, 12 November 2014. 
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targeting system, and the subject of substantial technical assistance from the 
World Bank and other agencies.33 
 
At the time of the fieldwork for this research, the common targeting mechanism, 
and the national household register on which it depended, remained a stated 
intention rather than a reality. It was too early to tell when the technical assistance 
that had been initiated would bear fruit, but from interviews with the managers of 
LEAP and other programmes, it seemed safe to conclude that this was not 
achievable in the short term.34 
 
 
7. Conclusion – Towards explaining Ghana’s 
social protection policy path: Elections, elites, 
technocrats and donors 
 
This paper has reviewed the most significant social protection policy reforms 
introduced in Ghana since 2000, including the introduction of a national health 
insurance scheme, substantial reforms to the contributory pensions system and a 
parsimonious conditional cash transfer programme targeted at the extreme poor 
as well as schemes aimed at improving food security and access to basic 
education. Despite significant progress, all of these programmes have faced 
substantial operational problems, and allegations of ‘resource leakages’, political 
manipulation of resource allocation (for electoral or intra-party factional 
purposes) are common. The impact of these programmes have also been 
disappointing in many respects: the ‘third tier’ of the new pension system has 
failed to attract a large proportion of the informal sector, the National Health 
Insurance Scheme’s coverage remains low (just over one third of the population) 
and the LEAP programme reaches a small proportion of the extremely poor, and 
even those households that it reaches have only seen modest improvements in 
health and other socio-economic outcomes. 
 
Several questions therefore remain to be answered. First, among these is the 
question of why the specific reforms were enacted, and why the specific policy 
choices were made. Second, who and what drove the reform process: to what 
extent (and for which programmes) were politicians the primary drivers of reform 
and to what extent were bureaucrats the primary drivers? What was the 
relationship between these primary actors within the Ghanaian polity, and what 
was the role and influence of civil society (including organised labour and non-
                                         
33 Interviews, William Niyuni (10 November 2014), Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu (12 
November 2014), Christabel Sefa and Dina Ringold (21 November 2014). 
34 Interview, Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, 12 November 2014. 
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governmental organisations) and transnational actors (including bilateral donors 
and the Bretton Woods institutions)? An alternative way of stating this question 
would be to ask who had significant agenda-setting power, how did certain 
potential reforms enter the political agenda, and what allowed some of them to 
gain sufficient traction and momentum to be enacted as policy. Furthermore, why 
does there appear to exist broad cross-party consensus. In sum: How did Ghanaian 
political dynamics drive social protection policy reform? 
 
A number of striking features can be discerned from this account of reforms to 
both contributory and non-contributory social protection in Ghana. These include 
that the government of the nominally ‘right-of-centre’ NPP party introduced most 
of the substantial reforms. Second, there is an unusual focus on contributory social 
insurance as opposed to social assistance in Ghanaian social protection policy – 
and this appears to enjoy the support of both major party; neither party has seized 
the populist initiative and built a political programme around large-scale social 
assistance. Third, the discourse around social assistance in Ghana reveals little 
controversy around an approach that targets the extreme poor, with the only 
significant debates being about appropriate methodologies for doing so. This is in 
line with the discourse favoured by many donors – who seek the greatest possible 
impact on the most vulnerable – but stands in stark contrast to countries like  
Uganda where poverty targeting has proven very controversial and a preference 
for ‘universal’ or ‘categorical’ benefits existed (see Grebe, 2014). It further 
appears curious and not immediately explicable why poverty among two groups 
that in other African countries have received a great deal of attention – the elderly 
and children (often specifically ‘orphans and vulnerable children’) – have 
received scant attention, except as part of the more general programmes targeting 
poor households and in the form of education-based programmes primarily 
designed to enhance enrolment rates. (It appears that neither universal social 
pensions nor a dedicated OVC grant has been seriously contemplated by policy-
makers.) Furthermore, Ghana’s total social protection expenditure remains low 
(around 0.5% of GDP) and is disproportionally allocated to programmes targeting 
the working-age population. 
 
All of these questions can only be addressed by means of a careful analysis of 
political dynamics in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’. Ghana’s polity has been 
described as one characterised by a ‘competitive clientelistic political settlement’ 
in which competitive elections and neopatrimonialist elements coexist. There is 
also significant debate about electoral dynamics in Ghana’s fourth republic and 
party political ‘branding’ and campaign strategy. The more explanatory 
companion paper addresses these questions by means of a range of theoretical 
tools. The companion paper reviews the literature on elections in Ghana, elite 
politics, the bureaucracy-politics interface, state-civil society relations and 
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transnational factors (such as donor influence) in order to disentangle the various 







Appendix 1: Policy timeline 
 
  
Year Legislation/policy/programme Notes 
1965 Social Security Act Largely civil servants; provident fund, old age 
lump sum, invalidity & survivors’ benefits 
1991 Social Security Law Conversion of provident funds into SSNIT 
funded pension scheme and Cap 30 closed to 
new entrants. 
1992 Election: Rawlings/NDC NPP boycotts parliamentary election 
1996 Election: Rawlings/NDC  
2000 Election: Kufuor/NPP  
2002 Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005) 
 
2003 National Health Insurance 
Scheme 
Act 650 of 2003 
2004 Election: Kufuor/NPP  
2004 Capitation Grant Expansion of free primary education 
2005 Ghana School Feeding 
Programme 
Costs shared between GoG and donors 
2006 GPRS II (2006-2009)  
2007 National Social Protection 
Strategy 
Targeting of the ‘extreme poor’ 
2008 Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty 
Introduced right before election? 5-year pilot, 
financed by GoG (WB funds addition 28k 
HHs); soft conditional 
2008 NHIS free membership children 
& pregnant women 
NB: Check whether this reform was 
introduced before the election 
2008 New Pensions Act Introduced three-tier pensions system and 
pensions regulatory authority 
2008 Election: Mills/NDC NPP candidate: Nana Akufo-Addo 
2010 Agriculture Subsidy Programme Intention to expand to all farmers 
2012 New national targeting 
mechanism 
Designed with help of WB & UNICEF; 
Implementation lagging owing to challenges 
in generating national households register 
2012 Mills dies Vice-President John Mahama accedes in 
acting capacity 





Abdulai, A.-G. 2014a. The Political Challenge of Protecting the Poorest insights 
from the Ghana School Feeding Programme. Paper presented at the Second 
UGBS Conference on Busines and Development, Accra, Ghana.  
 
Abdulai, A.-G. 2014c. The politics of educational inequality in Ghana. Paper 
presented at the 7th Annual Africa workshop on the theme: 'Distributive Goods 
and Distributive Politics', American Political Science Association, Maputo, 
Mozambique.  
 
Abebrese, J. 2011. Social Protection in Ghana: An overview of existing 
programmes and their prospects and challenges. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
 
Aboderin, I. 2004a. Decline in material family support for older people in Urban 
Ghana, Africa: Understanding processes and causes of change. Journals of 
Gerontology Series B-Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 59(3): S128-
S137.  
 
Aboderin, I. 2004b. Intergenerational Family Support and Older Age Economic 
Security in Ghana. In P. Lloyd-Sherlock (Ed.) Living Longer: Ageing, 
Development and Social Protection. London and New York: Zed Books. 
 
Agyepong, I.A. & S. Adjei. 2008. Public social policy development and 
implementation: a case study of the Ghana National Health Insurance scheme. 
Health Policy Plan, 23(2): 150-160.  
 
Akyeampong, K., Djangmah, J., Oduro, A., Seidu, A. & F. Hunt. 2007. Access to 
Basic Education in Ghana: The Evidence and the Issues Country Analytic Report. 
Sussex: Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity. 
 
Ampratwum, E. & D. Armah-Attoh. 2010a. Public Expenditure Tracking Survey 
in Education: Tracking Capitation Grant in Public Primary Schools in Ghana 
CDD-Ghana Reasearch Paper No. 19. Accra: Ghana Centre for Democratic 
Development. 
 
Ampratwum, E. & D. Armah-Attoh. 2010c. Tracking Capitation Grant in Public 
Primary Schools in Ghana CDD-Ghana Briefing Paper, 10(1). Accra: Ghana 
Centre for Democratic Development. 
 
Ampratwum, E., Armah-Attoh, D. & M.A. Ashon. 2012. Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey in Education: Tracking Possible Leakages in the Distribution of 
45 
 
Textbooks in Public Primary Schools in Ghana CDD-Ghana Research Paper No. 
20. Accra: Ghana Centre for Democratic Development. 
 
Apoya, P. & A. Marriott. 2011. Achieving a shared goal: free universal health 
care in Ghana. Oxford: Oxfam International. 
 
Apt, N. A. 1986. Support Sources and Well-Being of the Elderly in Ghana. 
Zeitschrift Fur Gerontologie, 19(2): 90-95.  
 
Apt, N. A. 1991. Activities, care and support of ageing women in Africa: A 
Ghanaian case study. In I. Hoskins (Ed.), Older women as beneficiaries and 
contributors to development: International perspectives. Washington, DC: 
American Association of Retired Persons. 
 
Apt, N. A. 1992. Family support to elderly people in Ghana. In L. C. Coppard & 
A. Hashimoto (Eds.), Family support to the elderly. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 203-212. 
 
Apt, N. A. 2002. Ageing and the changing role of the family and community: An 
African perspective. International Social Security Review, 55(1): 39-47.  
Arhin, A. A. 2013. Promising Start, but bleak future? Progress of Ghana's 
National Health Insurance Schemes towards Universal Health Coverage. 
Developing Country Studies, 3(13): 151-159.  
 
Barrientos, A., Gorman, M. & A. Heslop. 2003. Old Age Poverty in Developing 
Countries: Contributions and Dependence in Later Life. World Development, 
31(3), 555-570.  
 
Barrientos, A. & P. Lloyd-Sherlock. 2002. Older and poorer? Ageging and 
poverty in the South. Journal of International Development, 14: 1129-1131.  
 
Boafo-Arthur, K. 1999. Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics 
of Continuity. African Studies Review, 42(2): 41-72.  
Bowden, S. & P. Mosley. 2012. Politics, Public Expenditure and the Evolution of 
Poverty in Africa, 1920-2009 Sheffied Economic Research Paper 2012003. 
Sheffield: Department of Economics, University of Sheffield. 
 
Cooke, E. F. A., Hague, S., Cockburn, J., El Lagha, A.-R. & L. Tiberti. 2014. 
Estimating the impact on poverty of Ghana's fuel subsidy reform and a mitigating 
response. UNICEF Working Paper 2014-02. Accra: UNICEF. 
 
Craig, D. & D. Porter. 2003. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New 




Devereux, S. & P. White. 2010. Social Protection in Africa: Evidence, Politics 
and Rights. Poverty & Public Policy, 2(3): 516-540.  
Embassy of Switzerland. 2014. Press Release - Switzerland supports Ghana's 
Pension Reforms [Press release] 
 
FAO. 2013. Impacts of the LEAP Programme on the Local Economy in Ghana 
PtoP Research Brief. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
 
Fraser, A. 2005. Poverty reduction strategy papers: Now who calls the shots? 
Review of African Political Economy, 32(104-105): 317-340.  
 
Garcia, M. & C.M.T. Moore. 2012. The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash 
Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Ghana Statistical Service. 2014. National Population Projection, 2010 to 2014. 
Accra: Ghana Statistical Service. 
 
GoG. 2003a. Agenda for Growth and Prosperity: Ghana's Proverty Reduction 
Strategy 2003-2005 (Vol. I: Analysis and Policy Statement).  Accra: Government 
of Ghana. 
 
GoG. 2003c. Agenda for Growth and Prosperity: Ghana's Proverty Reduction 
Strategy 2003-2005 (Vol. II: Costing and Financing of Programmes and 
Projects).  Accra: Government of Ghana. 
 
GoG. 2005. Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) 2006-2009.  
Accea: Government of Ghana. 
 
GoG. 2006. Presidential Commission on Pensions. Accra: Government of Ghana. 
 
Granvik, M. 2015. Policy Diffusion, Domestic Politics and Social Protection in 
Lesotho, 1998-2012. CSSR Working Paper No. 357. Cape Town: Centre for 
Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
 
Grebe, E. 2014. Donor agenda-setting, bureaucratic advocacy and cash transfers 
in Uganda (2002-2013) CSSR Working Paper No. 352. Cape Town: Centre for 
Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
 
Grebe, E. 2015. The politics of social protection in a competitive African 
democracy: Explaining social protection policy reform in Ghana (2000-2014) 
47 
 
CSSR Working Paper No. 361. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, 
University of Cape Town. 
 
Grebe, E. & J.B. Mubiru. 2014. Development and social policy reform in Uganda: 
The slow emergence of a social protection agenda (1986-2014) CSSR Working 
Paper No. 353. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of 
Cape Town. 
 
Gyimah-Boadi, E. & H.K. Prempeh. 2012. Oil, Politics, and Ghana’s Democracy. 
Journal of Democracy, 23(3): 94-108.  
 
Handa, S., Park, M., Darko Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., Davis, B. & S. Daidone. 
2014. Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Programme: Impact Evaluation. 
Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill.  
 
Hickey, S. 2007. Conceptualising the Politics of Social Protection in Africa. 
BWPI Working Paper. Manchester. Retrieved from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1204542 
 
Hickey, S. & G. Mohan. 2008. The politics of establishing pro-poor 
accountability: What can poverty reduction strategies achieve? Review of 
International Political Economy, 15(2): 234-258. 
 
Hickey, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Günter, B. & I. MacAuslan. 2009. Promoting 
Social Transfers: DFID and the Politics of Influencing. DFID Working Paper 32. 
London: Department for International Development. 
 
ILO. 2014. Rationalizing social protection expenditure in Ghana: consolidated 
version: draft for comments (S. P. D. International Labour Office, Trans.). 
Geneva: International Labour Organization. 
 
IMF. 2014a. IMF Statement on Ghana [Press release] 
 
IMF. 2014b. Statement by IMF Deputy Managing Director Min Zhu on Ghana 
[Press release] 
 
Konadu-Agyemang, K. 2000. The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: 
Structural Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case 




Kpessa, M. W. 2011a. The politics of retirement income security policy in Ghana: 
Historical trajectories and transformative capabilities. African Journal of Political 
Science and International Relations, 5(2): 92-102.  
 
Kpessa, M. W. 2011f. Retirement income security under Ghana's three-tier 
pension model: Assessment of risks and options for reform. Pensions: An 
International Journal, 16(2): 127-136.  
 
Kraus, J. 1991. The Struggle over structural Adjustment in Ghana. Africa Today, 
38(4): 19-37.  
 
Lazarus, J. 2008. Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: reviewing 
the past, assessing the present and predicting the future. Third World Quarterly, 
29(6): 1205-1221.  
 
Lindberg, S. I. 2003. 'It's Our Time to "Chop"': Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-
Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It? Democratization, 10(2): 121-140.  
 
Lloyd-Sherlock, P. 2000. Old Age and Poverty in Developing Countries: New 
Policy Changes. World Development, 28(12): 2157-2168.  
 
Luiz, J. M. 2013. A Review of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: From the 
Colonial Legacy to the Millennium Development Goals. Economic Papers: A 
journal of applied economics and policy, 32(1): 110-121.  
 
McGee, R., Levene, J. & A. Hughes. 2002. Assessing participation in poverty 
reduction strategy papers: a desk-based synthesis of experience in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Research Report 52. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
MESW. 2012. Ghana National Social Protection Strategy (GH-GNSPS).  Accra: 
Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare. 
 
MLGRD. undated. Ghana School Feeding Programme. Accra: GSFP Secretariat, 
Ministry of Local Government and Rurual Development. 
 
MMYE. 2007. The National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS).  Accra: Ministry 
of Manpower, Youth and Employment. 
 
MoGCSP. 2014a. Fact Sheet: Economic Growth and LEAP. In C. a. S. P. Ministry 




MoGCSP. 2014b. Fact Sheet: Reaching the Poorest Families Through the 
National Targeting System (NTS). In C. a. S. P. Ministry of Gender (Ed.). Accra: 
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection. 
 
MoGCSP. (014c. Fact Sheet: Social Protection in Ghana. In C. a. S. P. Ministry 
of Gender (Ed.) Vol. 9. Accra: Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection. 
 
MoGCSP, UNICEF, & USAID. 2014. LEAP 1000: Cash transfer for Extremely 
Poor Pregnant Women and Infants for better Nutrition. In C. a. S. P. Ministry of 
Gender (Ed.) Accra: Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection. 
 
National Health Insurance Act (Act 650 of 2003). 2003. Parliament of Ghana. 
2003. 
 
NHIS. 2013. Annual Report 2012. Accra: National Health Insurance Scheme. 
 
NHIS. 2015, 27 April. Government working on bailout for NHIS.   Retrieved 5 
May 2015 from http://www.nhis.gov.gh/News/Government-working-on-bailout-
for-NHIS-%234056#.VUj7olWqpBc 
 





NPRA. 2015. NPRA Public Notice: Amendment to the National Pensions Act 
2008 (Act 766).   Retrieved 5 May 2015, 2015, from 
http://npra.gov.gh/pdf/Public-Notice-April-on-Amendment.pdf 
 





Nyonator, F., Ofosu, A., Segbafah, M., & S. d'Almeida. 2014. Monitoring and 
Evaluating Progress towards Universal Health Coverage in Ghana. PLoS Med, 
11(9): e1001691.  
 
Park, M., Handa, S., Darko Osei, R., & I. Osei-Akoto. 2012. Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Proverty Program: Assessment of LEAP Operations. 
Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at 




Peace FM Online. 2013. The NDC Should Not Scrap LEAP - Frema Opare. Peace 
FM Online, 16 February. 
 
Rademacher-Schulz, C. & E. Salifu Mahama. 2012. "Where the Rain Falls" 
Project Case Study: Ghana Report No. 3. Bonn: United Nations University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). 
 
National Pensions Act. 2008. Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 766 Stat. 
Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 4 December. 
 
Schieber, G., Cashin, C., Saleh, K. & R. Lavado. 2012. Health Financing in 
Ghana. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Seekings, J. 2002. The Broader Importance of Welfare Reform in South Africa. 
Social Dynamics, 28(2): 1-38.  
 
Seekings, J. 2006. "Not a single white person should be allowed to go under": 
Swartgevaar and the origins of South Africa's welfare state, 1924-1929. CSSR 
Working Paper No. 154. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, 
University of Cape Town. 
 
Seekings, J. 2008. The Carnegie Commission and the Backlash against Welfare 
State-Building in South Africa, 1931-1937. Journal of Southern African Studies, 
34(3), 2008-2008. 
 
Seekings, J. 2013. The Politics of Social Policy in Africa. In N. Cheeseman, D. 
Anderson, & A. Scheibler (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of African Politics. 
London: Routledge, pp. 309-321. 
 
SSNIT. undated. Membership.   Retrieved 6 May 2015 from 
http://www.ssnit.org.gh/membership.php 
 
The Statesman. 2009. Pension Reform in Ghana: Special Pension Scheme for the 




Today Ghana News. 2014. NPP's free education was for vote buying. Today 






UN. 2000. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 55/2: United Nations 
Millennium Declaration. New York: United Nations. 
 
WFP. 2012. Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis: Ghana 2012 
(Executive Brief). Accra: World Food Programme. 
 
Whitfield, L. 2005. Trustees of development from conditionality to governance: 
poverty reduction strategy papers in Ghana. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 43(04): 641. 
 
World Bank. 2012a. Improving the targeting of social programs in Ghana. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2012b. Managing Risk, Promoting Growth: Developing Systems for 
Social Protection in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2014a. Ghana Economic Update (October 2014). Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2014b. World Development Indicators: Ghana. World Development 
Indicators. Retrieved from: http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana 
 
Yaro, J. A. & J. Hesselberg. 2010. The Contours of Poverty in Northern Ghana: 
Policy Implications for Combating Food Insecurity. Research Review of the 
Institute of African Studies, 26(1): 81-112. 
 
 
